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REPUTATION AS A DISCIPLINARIAN OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
By Kristina Daugirdas*

ABSTRACT
As a disciplinarian of international organizations, reputation has serious shortcomings.
Even though international organizations have strong incentives to maintain a good reputation,
reputational concerns will sometimes fail to spur preventive or corrective action.
Organizations have multiple audiences, so efforts to preserve a “good” reputation may pull
organizations in many different directions, and steps taken to preserve a good reputation
will not always be salutary. Recent incidents of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers in the
Central African Republic illustrate these points.
On April 29, 2015, The Guardian published an explosive story based on a leaked UN
document.1 The document described allegations against French troops who had been
deployed to the Central African Republic pursuant to a mandate established by the
Security Council. According to the allegations, during the ﬁrst half of 2014, French soldiers
raped and sexually exploited boys as young as nine years old, in some cases in exchange for
food and money. The United Nations’ reaction, as described in the story, made things even
worse: upon learning about the allegations, UN ofﬁces in Geneva did nothing. Frustrated by
this inaction, one ofﬁcial, Anders Kompass, leaked the document to French authorities. His
boss responded by subjecting Kompass to disciplinary proceedings for the leak.
These allegations of rape and sexual misconduct, together with the United Nations’ seeming indifference, appeared to cause immense damage to the organization’s reputation. Indeed,
the secretary-general and numerous member states and UN ofﬁcials have invoked the organization’s reputation and the imperative to repair it.2 These concerns about the reputation
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, kdaugir@umich.edu. For excellent comments and helpful discussions, I thank Nicholas Bagley, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Kristen Boon, Andrew Clapham,
Monica Hakimi, Don Herzog, Vic Khanna, Nico Krisch, Nina Mendelson, Julian Mortenson, Jide Nzelibe,
Anne Peters, Steve Ratner; the current and former UN ofﬁcials who spoke with me; workshop participants at
the ASIL Midyear Meeting, the Graduate Institute in Geneva, and the University of Michigan; and the anonymous reviewers. For outstanding research assistance, I thank Adele Daniel, Madison Kavanaugh, Kate Powers, and
Marissa Perry.
1
Sandra Laville, UN Aid Worker Suspended for Leaking Report on Child Abuse by French Troops, GUARDIAN (Apr.
29, 2015), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/un-aid-worker-suspended-leaking-report-childabuse-french-troops-car.
2
See, e.g., Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council Meeting on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
(Mar. 10, 2016), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-03-10/secretary-generals-remarkssecurity-council-meeting-sexual (“First of all, I would like to thank you for your initiative in organizing this
very important subject, which has a lot to do with our reputation and of our work in the future.”); UN
SCOR, 71st Sess., 7642d mtg. at 7–8, 11, 18, 21, UN Doc. S/PV.7642 (Mar. 10, 2016) (statements from
China, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, New Zealand, and the secretary-general); UN Press Release,
Addressing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse Cases Involving Peacekeepers Requires Swift Accountability, Decisive
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seemed to motivate some concrete, visible steps to address the problem of sexual violence perpetrated by UN peacekeepers and other UN-afﬁliated individuals. For the ﬁrst time, the
Security Council adopted a resolution speciﬁcally addressing sexual abuse and exploitation;3
for the ﬁrst time, the organization ejected an entire contingent of UN peacekeepers in
response to such incidents;4 and for the ﬁrst time, a high-level UN ofﬁcial lost his job for
mishandling them.5 Less than a week into his term as the newly appointed secretary-general
of the United Nations, António Guterres signaled his intentions to stay focused on the issue
by establishing a new task force to overhaul the organization’s approach to preventing and
responding to sexual violence.6
In this instance, reputational concerns appeared to motivated some reforms. But if the reputational damage from such incidents is so extensive, and so predictable, why did the United
Nations and its member states not do more to avoid it? The allegations brought to light in
2015 were by no means unprecedented. Indeed, journalists and nongovernmental organizations began calling attention to the problem of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers and others—and the organization’s desultory response to such allegations—in the 1990s.7 Since
then, public attention has periodically seized on allegations that, yet again, UN peacekeepers
and others were victimizing the vulnerable individuals they were charged with protecting, and
the United Nations was doing relatively little to ensure that the perpetrators were punished.
The very persistence of the problem over more than two decades suggests that reputational
concerns were insufﬁcient to discipline the United Nations. If so, why? The answer matters
because, for international organizations, reputational sanctions are among the few constraints
on abuse.8 Formal legal mechanisms are only rarely available. Immunity usually keeps injured
individuals from being able to sue international organizations in national courts.9 The
International Court of Justice is formally available to issue advisory opinions regarding international organizations, but doing so requires the UN General Assembly or another UN organ
to adopt a resolution requesting one. Such requests are very rare.

Action, Speakers Tell General Assembly, UN Doc. GA/11819 (Sept. 7, 2016), at https://www.un.org/press/en/
2016/ga11810.doc.htm (statements from Jordan, Sweden, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and China that
addressed reputational harm to the United Nations).
3
SC Res. 2272 (Mar. 11, 2016).
4
MINUSCA Press Release, New Allegations of Sexual Abuse Emerge Against MINUSCA Peacekeepers (Feb. 4,
2016),
at
https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/new-allegations-sexual-abuse-emerge-against-minuscapeacekeepers.
5
UN’s CAR Envoy Gaye Sacked Over Peacekeeper Abuse Claims, BBC (Aug. 12, 2015), at http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-33890664.
6
UN Press Release, Secretary-General Creates High-Level Task Force to Improve United Nations Approach for
Preventing, Addressing Sexual Abuse, UN Doc. SG/A/1697 (Jan. 6, 2017).
7
GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS 215–18
(2011); Muna Ndulo, The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by
Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 127, 141–46 (2009).
8
See generally Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005) (identifying and analyzing source of accountability of international organizations).
9
While tort victims rarely have access to alternative remedies, individuals who have a contractual relationship
with the organization do more often. For example, the employees of international organizations are usually able to
turn to specialized administrative tribunals, and private individuals or ﬁrms that contract with international organizations may negotiate waivers that provide for dispute settlement.
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Outside of the context of international organizations, a large literature explores how reputational sanctions sometimes substitute for more formal legal sanctions.10 In general, the
literature characterizes reputation as a positive force. For example, reputation features prominently in accounts of why states comply with international law.11 Reputation can also explain
why corporations sometimes go above and beyond what the law requires, and take voluntary
steps to protect the environment or promote robust labor standards in their global supply
chains.12 Scholars of domestic administrative agencies, including local police departments,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Federal Reserve, have also explored
ways that reputation serves as a powerful motivator—and, by extension, as a constraint on
the behavior of actors within those agencies.13
Very little scholarship, by contrast, explores how reputational dynamics play out for international organizations.14 Building on the literature regarding other kinds of organizations and
using recent developments related to sexual violence in the Central African Republic as a case
study, this Article seeks to ﬁll that gap. I argue that as a disciplinarian, reputation has some
serious shortcomings. Sometimes reputational harm will fail to move an organization at all.
Sometimes reputational harm will motivate changes—but only superﬁcial ones. And sometimes concern about reputational harm will not only fail to solve the underlying problem, but
also tempt organizations to cover it up.
Part I of this Article explains why maintaining a good reputation is more complicated than
may appear. An international organization’s reputation reﬂects the aggregate beliefs of its
observers.15 But its reputation is multifaceted, not one-dimensional. International organizations (like domestic administrative agencies) have distinct reputations for legality, morality,
10
For an earlier example, see Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
(1963), 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); see also infra note 23.
11
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 33–41, 71–117 (2008); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking
the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231 (2009); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF
LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Beth Simmons,
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000).
12
See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE (2005). Indeed, regulations that require information
disclosure on such topics are designed to operate by raising the reputational stakes. See Adam S. Chilton &
Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 57 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2017);
JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS
RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM (2005).
13
DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT
THE FDA (2010); CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE
LEGALISTIC STATE (2009) (concluding that lawsuits prompted U.S. police departments to revise their policies
on use of force and handling claims of abuse not because the lawsuits imposed ﬁnancial costs, but because they
threatened the defendants’ professional reputations); Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft
Constraints, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (2015); Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law:
Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685 (2018); Emily Chiang,
Institutional Reform Shaming, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 53 (2015)
14
For an important exception, see Ian Johnstone, Do International Organizations Have Reputations?, 7 INT’L
ORGS. L. REV. 235, 239 (2010). Some of my own work has explored reputation in connection with the introduction of cholera to Haiti by UN peacekeepers. See Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation and the Responsibility of
International Organizations, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 991, 1013 (2014) [hereinafter Daugirdas 2014]; Kristina
Daugirdas, Reputation and Accountability: Another Look at the United Nations’ Response to the Cholera Epidemic
in Haiti, __ INT’L ORGS. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2019) (applying the framework set out in this Article) [hereinafter Daugirdas 2019].
15
CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 18, 26.
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effectiveness, and expertise. International organizations also have reputations for being independent from—or responsive to—their member states, or particular subsets of member
states. In general, tensions among these different dimensions are common, and some
trade-offs are unavoidable. In addition to having multiple reputations, international organizations have multiple audiences, including government ofﬁcials and the general public. These
different audiences do not always train their attention on the same feature of the organization’s conduct, or evaluate what they see according to the same criteria. Keeping these multiplicities in mind, Part II then considers some of the ways that international organizations
might respond to threats to their reputation, not all of which will be positive.
To illustrate and deepen this account of how reputation works for international organizations, Part III focuses on the Central African Republic. Notably, in the months after The
Guardian article described above was published, it became clear that the allegations against
the French soldiers reﬂected only a small part of a bigger problem. Many more allegations
subsequently came to light against “blue helmets”—peacekeepers under UN command—
in the Central African Republic. In turn, these new allegations called attention to a questionable decision the UN Secretariat made to accept peacekeeping troops from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) notwithstanding their inclusion on the United Nations’ own
list of parties that engage in sexual violence against children. The reputational account set out
in Part I helps to explain this and other key decisions made by UN ofﬁcials before and after the
allegations against the French soldiers were revealed to the public.
The absence of clear rules deﬁning an organization’s legal obligations compounds the problem. The United Nations, for example, has no clear legal obligations to prevent or respond to
allegations of sexual violence. As a result, one particularly important dimension of the United
Nations’ reputation—its reputation for compliance with the law—was not on the line in the
Central African Republic. In general, reputation will be a less effective disciplinarian for lawbreaking where there is room for debate over whether a particular act or omission is legal or
illegal. That sort of uncertainty is endemic to international organizations: their legal obligations are often contested and, as noted above, courts are rarely available to clarify them.
Even when reputational concerns do motivate organizations to respond to or prevent reputational harm, there is the question of how organizations respond. One possibility is that
organizations will limit themselves to symbolic or superﬁcial steps designed to quell the
immediate furor without solving the underlying problem. Organizations might opt for this
approach if they care more about the image they project than about whether that image corresponds to reality.16 They might also take this approach if they recognize the need to respond
but cannot muster the political will to take more forceful measures. Either way, it should not
be surprising when symbolic measures prove ineffective.
Another troubling possibility is that organizations will try to protect their reputations by
concealing derogatory information. After all, so long as derogatory information stays hidden,
it cannot cause reputational harm. International organizations have signiﬁcant tools at their
disposal to control and to limit the release of information about their activities. Indeed, the
director of an NGO quoted in The Guardian story described above characterized the United
16

Some NGOs have suggested as much. See, e.g., Bea Edwards, How to End Sexual Abuse in UN Peacekeeping
Missions, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (May 31, 2016), available at https://www.whistleblower.org/uncategorized/how-to-end-sexual-abuse-in-un-peacekeeping-missions.
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Nations’ initial response to the allegations as both “stomach turning” and consistent with the
organization’s “instinctive response to sexual violence in its ranks—ignore, deny, cover up,
[and] dissemble.”17
Part IV brieﬂy turns to some of the policy implications of the Article’s account of how reputation works for international organizations. Speciﬁcally, it argues that reputation can be a
more effective disciplinarian if pathological strategies for coping with reputational threats are
made both less available and less attractive. This Part offers a warning: simply making reputation a more prominent organizational concern may well backﬁre. That said, a sophisticated
understanding of reputational dynamics can usefully inform policy design, as well as highlight
the advantages and risks of some of the steps that the United Nations adopted after events in
the Central African Republic came to light.
I. REPUTATION AND ITS MULTIPLICITIES
To set out a framework for understanding reputational dynamics regarding international
organizations, this Article draws on the reputational literature relating to other kinds of organizations and entities: private ﬁrms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), administrative
agencies, and states. International organizations have important commonalities with—as well
as some salient differences from—these other kinds of organizations.
At bottom, a reputation is a set of beliefs that observers hold, or judgments that observers
make, about an individual or an organization.18 A good reputation is a source of value. For
private ﬁrms, that value can be measured in dollars and cents.19 Administrative agencies with
good reputations will attract more resources and more responsibilities.20 A good reputation is
what allows nongovernmental organizations to be effective and inﬂuential notwithstanding
their lack of coercive powers and (relative) lack of ﬁnancial resources.21 For states, too, a good
reputation is a source of soft power—that is, of inﬂuence above and beyond their material
resources.22 Because good reputations are valuable, the desire to maintain a good reputation
can be a powerful motivator. The reverse is also true: a bad reputation is a source of costs along
all of these dimensions. For this reason, reputation can be a disciplining force, a source of
penalties when an organization (or individual or other entity) falls short.23
These penalties—often termed reputational costs—are an informal, nonlegal sanction.
Reputational costs are not coordinated and centralized; instead they are imposed directly
17

Laville, supra note 1.
CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 33 (“Reputations are composed of symbolic beliefs about an organization—its
capacities, intentions, history, mission—and these images are embedded in a network of multiple audiences.”).
19
David Charney, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 396–97 (1990)
(noting, for example, that ﬁrms with good reputations can charge higher prices for its products—or attract workers
while paying lower wages).
20
CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 26, 54.
21
Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 203 (2002).
22
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER (2004).
23
There is a large law-and-economics literature that explores reputation as a type of informal sanction and considers, among other things, whether legal penalties ought to be adjusted to account for nonlegal sanctions including reputational sanctions. See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational
Sanctions, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2014); Murat C. Mungan, A Generalized Model for Reputational Sanctions
and the (Ir)relevance of the Interactions between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 46 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 86
(2016); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996).
18
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by those who observe or interact with a particular organization. When an organization’s reputation is damaged—that is, when an organization’s audience discovers that the organization
is worse than previously believed along some dimension, the organization’s audience will
change its behavior. Some members of the audience may choose to stop interacting with
the organization entirely, or they may drive a harder bargain when they do. Thus, for example,
a state that develops a reputation for not living up to its treaty commitments will have a harder
time ﬁnding treaty partners, and a ﬁrm that develops a reputation for making lousy products
will have fewer repeat customers.
To understand when and how reputational concerns will affect organizational decisionmaking, it is essential to keep in mind three multiplicities: (1) the multiplicity of reputations
that these individuals and entities can have; (2) the multiplicity of audiences who observe and
judge those individuals and entities; and (3) the multiplicity of individuals and entities within
an organization to whom or to which a reputation can attach. These multiplicities explain
why organizations that may appear unmoved by reputation costs are actually quite sensitive
to them. In other words, it is not that international organizations are indifferent to reputational costs, but that they face trade-offs among different facets of reputation and sometimes
cannot simultaneously satisfy the diverging preferences of their multiple audiences.
A. IO Reputation Matters
To start, it is worth elaborating why having a good reputation is especially important to
international organizations. International organizations are like nongovernmental organizations in that their material resources are quite limited; so too are their formal legal authorities.
As a result, their effectiveness turns to a signiﬁcant degree on their ability to persuade other
actors to take or refrain from a particular course of action. And their capacity to persuade
depends on having a good reputation.24 A good reputation makes it more likely that these
organizations will be taken at their word. Thus, for example, the reputation of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is so good among
scholars that they will often cite OECD statistics without feeling any need to justify them
as a valid measure of the indicator in question.25 Also like nongovernmental organizations,
international organizations compete for resources. They must be able to make a convincing
case that their cause is a worthy one—and that they can make some headway in addressing
it. After all, states could choose to devote their resources elsewhere—to other international
organizations or initiatives, or even to national government agencies.
Among other things, international organizations’ dependence on voluntary cooperation
and support narrows the kinds of reputations they might cultivate. While some states
might prefer to chart an isolationist and belligerent course of action, international organizations do not have that option. Some private ﬁrms—think Uber—develop business models
that involve deliberately ﬂouting certain laws or regulations that apply to their conduct.26
24
J.C. Sharman, Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation, 55 POL. STUD. 20, 30 (2007) (arguing
that “[a]n international organization’s effectiveness is inseparably bound up with judgments about the reputation
of that institution”).
25
Id. at 31 (quoting Tony Porter and Michael Webb).
26
Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 SO. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017) (describing
certain private ﬁrms, including Uber, making decisions to strategically violate applicable laws and regulations as
part of their business model).
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It is hard to see an international organization pursuing a comparable strategy by, say, ignoring
obligations undertaken in a headquarters agreement in order to pressure a host state.27
It is quite common for high-level ofﬁcials to describe preserving a good reputation for their
organization as a central aspect of their jobs. Thus, in a vision statement he submitted as a
candidate for the post of secretary-general, António Guterres wrote: “The SG must stand
ﬁrmly for the reputation of the UN and its dedicated staff.”28 A scholar describing the
work of the Global Water Partnership wrote: “There is constant attention paid to the reputational risks induced by each and every action which can be described as part of the activity of
GWP.”29 Member states have also expressed concern about the reputations of the organizations in which they participate. This is the case with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse
by UN peacekeepers and others implementing UN mandates.30 And it is also true more
generally.31
Some international organizations have adopted policies that explicitly instruct staff to consider the consequences of their actions for the reputation of the organization that employs
them. For example, the word “reputation” appears eighteen times in the World Health
Organization’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct.32 Action that results in reputational
27
Given the uncertainty and contestation regarding many aspects of international organizations’ international
legal obligations, international organizations do sometimes operate in “gray areas” where the content of their obligations is not clear. See infra Part III.E. In these situations, international organizations use a range of strategies to
avoid being perceived as scofﬂaws. Sometimes they will comply with the relevant norm without expressly acknowledging any legal obligation to do so; sometimes they will cease the challenged conduct; and sometimes they will
directly challenge the applicability of the relevant norm. See Daugirdas 2014, supra note 14, at 1012–16.
28
Jenni Lee, 7 Quotes from António Guterres, UN FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2016), at http://unfoundationblog.
org/7-quotes-from-antonio-guterres.
29
Edouard Fromageau, The Global Water Partnership: Between Institutional Flexibility and Legal Legitimacy, 8
INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 367, 393–94 (2011).
30
See supra note 2; see also Kieran Guilbert, UN Investigating Leaked Sex Abuse Complaints in Central African
Republic, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2017), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-un-peacekeepers/uninvestigating-leaked-sex-abuse-complaints-in-central-african-republic-idUSKCN1BP2QC (quoting MINUSCA
spokesperson Vladimir Monteiro as saying: “It [MINUSCA] recognizes that sexual exploitation and abuse cases
have severely affected the mission’s credibility and reputation in the past.”); UN SC, 6942nd mtg., UN Doc.
S/PV.6842 at 5 (Oct. 3, 2012) (“The Secretary-General has recalled that the ﬁrst priority is the reputation of
the United Nations. It is for that reason, inter alia, that in Haiti we have intensiﬁed our zero-tolerance measures
against abuse of all kinds, especially the sexual abuse of minors.”) (statement of the Head of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti); UN SC, 6936th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6936 at 4 (Mar. 20, 2013) (“It is essential to
our reputation that the conduct of our personnel be in conformity with the highest standards and that prompt and
decisive action be taken to prevent abuse, to investigate allegations and to impose disciplinary measures where
warranted.”) (statement of interim head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti); UN Will
Enforce “Zero Tolerance” Policy Against Sexual Abuse, Peacekeeping Ofﬁcial Says, UN NEWS (Jan. 5, 2007), at
https://news.un.org/en/story/2007/01/205142-un-will-enforce-zero-tolerance-policy-against-sexual-abusepeacekeeping (quoting Assistant Secretary-General Jane Holl Lute as saying: “The reputation of UN peacekeeping
is one of our most powerful assets, which is why we have responded over the past couple of years so strongly[.]”).
31
See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 14, at 238; Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism 59 INT’L
ORG. 495 (2005); Daugirdas 2014, supra note 14.
32
World Health Organization, Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (Apr. 9, 2017), available at http://www.
who.int/about/ethics/code_of_ethics_full_version.pdf; see also, e.g., International Monetary Fund (IMF), Code of
Conduct for Staff (July 31, 1998), at https://www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm (“We all have a responsibility to
contribute to the good governance of the IMF and to help maintain its reputation for probity, integrity, and impartiality.”); see also id. (“You should refrain from participating in any activity that is in conﬂict with the interests of
the IMF or would damage the IMF’s reputation.”); World Intellectual Property Organization, Code of Conduct,
Including Procurement Related, for WIPO Staff, available at http://world-intellectual-property-organization.com/
export/sites/www/procurement/en/docs/code_of_conduct_for_wipo_staff_including_procurement.pdf (“The
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damage to the United Nations can qualify as an abuse of authority by senior UN personnel.33
Of particular relevance to the Central African Republic case study, UN peacekeepers have
been required since 2017 to carry a “No Excuse” pocket card; among other things, the
card reminds peacekeepers: “Sexual exploitation and abuse undermines discipline, and damages the reputation of the United Nations.”34 Given the importance of reputation to international organizations’ efﬁcacy, such deliberate efforts are unsurprising.
B. Three Multiplicities
So far, this discussion has discussed reputations as ranging from good to bad along a onedimensional spectrum. In fact, reputation and reputational dynamics are more complicated.
1. Multiplicity of reputations
The ﬁrst complication is that reputations are multi-dimensional. A person might simultaneously have reputations for being a brilliant lawyer and a jerk.35 In the international realm,
in addition to having reputations for complying with the law (or not), states also have reputations for cooperativeness, rationality, and toughness.36 Private corporations have, in addition to reputations for legality, reputations for the quality of their products or customer
service, reputations as employers, and reputations for their corporate citizenship. Domestic
administrative agencies have reputations for efﬁcacy (that is, for the quality of their decision
making and their capacity for effectively achieving their objectives), as well as for technical
expertise, morality, and legality.37
The reputations of international organizations are similarly multifaceted. To a signiﬁcant
degree, the salient dimensions of IO secretariats’ reputations track those of domestic administrative agencies. International organizations too have reputations for efﬁcacy, morality,
legality, and technical expertise.
In addition, international organizations have a ﬁfth salient dimension of reputation: they
have reputations for independence from, or responsiveness to and cooperativeness with, their
member states (or subsets of their member states). These elements of secretariats’ reputations
are especially important, and also in some tension with one another. On the one hand,
staff member should at all time behave in a way that upholds the values and the integrity and good reputation of
WIPO.”).
33
Marie Deschamps, Hassan B. Jalllow & Yasmin Sooka, Report of an Independent Review on Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic, Taking Action
on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers, at 67, 75, UN Doc. A/71/99 (Dec. 17, 2015), at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/840749/?ln=en [hereinafter CAR Panel Report].
34
UN Press Release, The “No Excuse” Card Is Online and Ready to be Distributed (June 2, 2017), at https://
www.un.int/news/no-excuse-card-online-and-ready-be-distributed.
35
Indeed, even focusing just on professional reputation, it is possible to break out additional dimensions. See,
e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Lawyerly Integrity in the Trump Administration, LAWFARE (May 14, 2017), at https://www.
lawfareblog.com/lawyerly-integrity-trump-administration (noting that political appointees in government have,
inter alia, reputations for loyalty, competence, and the quality of their judgment).
36
Brewster, supra note 11; JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102–03
(2007), Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 487,
497 (1997); Ryan Brutger & Joshua T. Kertzer, A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs, 72 INT’L ORG. 693, 699
(2018); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S95 (2002).
37
CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 46–47.
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international organizations have strong incentives to be cooperative with their member
states.38 After all, they are the ones who created the organization—and they are the ones
who fund and otherwise sustain the organization’s activities. On the other hand, international
organizations are often effective and inﬂuential precisely because their secretariats are perceived to be independent and not in the pocket of any individual state or group of states.
In other words, independence is an essential component of their authority and effectiveness.39
For example, independence is what makes states willing to negotiate with or accept advice or
conditions from international organizations that they would reject from other states on the
grounds that advice coming from other governments is biased or strategically motivated.40
Tensions among different facets of reputation are common. Thus, for example, Nick
Parrillo describes the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency being torn
between promulgating environmental standards within statutorily required deadlines and
ensuring those standards have adequate scientiﬁc support—something that takes time to
develop.41 As a result, organizations cannot always avoid reputational costs altogether, though
they may be able to choose where the blows land.
2. Multiplicity of audiences
The second multiplicity that is crucial to understanding reputational dynamics concerns
audience or audiences. As noted above, an organization’s audience is made up of all of the
individuals and entities that are in a position to observe, evaluate, and judge an organization’s
actions—and to impose reputational costs in response to undesirable behavior. For corporations, these audiences include consumers, shareholders, employees, regulators, and banks.42
For administrative agencies, like the FDA, the audiences include scientists, the U.S. Congress,
consumer representatives, and media organizations.43 For international organizations, these
observers—their audience—include not just member states, but also academics, journalists,
nongovernmental organizations, and government ofﬁcials like judges and members of
legislatures.
The public is an important audience too—including, perhaps counterintuitively, for international organizations. The ability to speak “over the heads” of governments and directly
address the public is an important source of these organizations’ authority and inﬂuence.44
International organizations make deliberate efforts to reach the public through speeches, op38
Paul B. Stephan, Reputation and Responsibility: Moving the Goalposts, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 26, 2015), at https://
www.ejiltalk.org/reputation-and-responsibility-moving-the-goalposts; see also SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 11.
39
Michael Barnett & Liv Coleman, Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International
Organizations, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 593, 598 (2005) (international organizations’ claims to authority “frequently
turn on the belief that they are impersonal and neutral, that is, that they are not exercising power but instead are
using impartial, objective, and value-neutral knowledge to serve others. . . . Because their authority is premised on
these beliefs, international organizations are likely to be quite attentive to this very image . . .”).
40
For a theoretical account of the value of independence, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States
Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3 (1998). For a narrative account of the value
of the independence of the UN secretary-general, see BRIAN URQUHART, HAMMARSKJOLD 94–105 (1972).
41
Parrillo, supra note 13, at 791–93.
42
Cf. GARY ALAN FINE, DIFFICULT REPUTATIONS 167–68 (2001) (identifying consumers, shareholders, employees, fellow business leaders, and the general public as judges of economic ﬁgures).
43
CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 10.
44
THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION 121 (1985).
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eds, and—these days—social media.45 These efforts often bear fruit: the public often accords
signiﬁcant weight to the recommendations and decisions of international organizations.46
The particular communities in which international organizations operate constitute another
public audience for the organization. The organization’s reputation in the eyes of these communities can have direct impacts on the success or failure of an operation on the ground.47
Several observations can be made about these various audiences. First, the audiences are
not merely passive recipients of information supplied by the organization they are observing.48 These audiences can contribute new legal arguments, facts, or factual analysis, and
they can evaluate the legal and factual analysis done by others.49 Sometimes they can take
actions that can lead to formal legal sanctions. For example, in the United States, an NGO
could ﬁle a citizen suit alleging that a certain corporation is violating the Clean Water Act.
Such audience members can also keep an issue in the public eye long after the targeted entity
hoped attention would fade.50
Second, an organization’s audiences may reach divergent conclusions when evaluating its
conduct. These may focus their attention on different information. A corporation’s shareholders might be most concerned about a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, while a human rights NGO
might be most concerned about the labor conditions in the ﬁrm’s supply chain. Even
when they are observing identical conduct, audience members may evaluate it differently,
disagreeing about the importance of a particular incident, and even whether that incident
reﬂects well or poorly on the actor.51 When the FDA takes a tough enforcement action, consumers may cheer the same decision that pharmaceutical companies deplore. Ideology and

45

Ana Campoy, These Are the Most Popular International Organizations on Twitter, QUARTZ (Nov. 30, 2017), at
https://qz.com/1143475/the-un-is-the-international-organization-with-the-most-followers-on-twitter (noting
that the United Nations had 9.4 million Twitter followers in 2017 and that other international organizations likewise had millions); António Guterres, Opinion, The Rohingya are Victims of Ethnic Cleansing. The World Has Failed
Them. WASH. POST. (July 10, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rohingya-are-victims-of-ethniccleansing-the-world-has-failed-them/2018/07/10/08cab8a0-8447-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_story.html.
46
See generally KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION (2013); see also
Alexander Thompson, Screening Power: International Organizations as Informative Agents, in DELEGATION AND
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 229 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson &
Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006).
47
See Daugirdas 2019, supra note 14 (discussing the United Nations’ concerns about its reputation on the
ground in Haiti).
48
Capturing this idea, Gary Alan Fine uses the term “reputational entrepreneurs” to describe these audiences
with varying resources, outlets, and interests when it comes to observing and making claims about the target. FINE,
supra note 42, at 20–21 (2001); see also id. at 63 (explaining that reputational entrepreneurship “depends upon the
presence of three elements: motivation, narrative facility, and institutional placement”); id. at 87 (identifying features that are critical to the success of reputational entrepreneurs: “the interests of a community, the narrative
resonance of the reputation, and the institutional placement of those making claims”).
49
Daugirdas 2014, supra note 14, at 998-99. Audiences can also help shape reputation by remaining silent, and
thereby ceding ground to others. FINE, supra note 42, at 60–90 (explaining how President Warren Harding’s reputation for incompetence solidiﬁed in part due to the silence of those who could have supplied and supported a
rival narrative).
50
Daugirdas 2014, supra note 14, at 1000–07.
51
See Brutger & Kertzer, supra note 36 (using survey data to illustrate that individuals with different policy
dispositions (i.e., hawks and doves) disagree about whether certain actions related to foreign policy enhance or
damage reputation).
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partisanship may also underlie divergent assessments of the same conduct.52 In short, in the
face of heterogenous audiences, deﬁning a “good” reputation is no mean task.53
Third, and most importantly, organizations are not equally responsive to all of their audiences. The reputational literature on private ﬁrms is especially useful for this point.
Sometimes a negative evaluation will prompt an organization to change because market transactions internalize the cost. Thus, private ﬁrms that defraud customers will not have much
repeat business, and companies that defraud their employees will face higher input costs.54
But what about when ﬁrms harm individuals with whom they do not do business? Consider
an electroplating company that dumps toxic chemicals into a municipal storm sewer, thereby
damaging downstream ﬁsheries.55 If the ﬁrm is acting illegally, it will face legal costs from the
violation. But it may not face reputational costs above and beyond those legal costs. The ﬁshermen do not do business with the ﬁrm; those who do lack incentives to reduce their demand
for the ﬁrm’s product, since the dumping does not affect the product’s quality.56 And, indeed,
some empirical evidence supports the conclusion that ﬁrms that violate environmental laws
do not face reputational penalties that exceed the legal penalty.57
This example highlights one feature of reputation that distinguishes it from formal mechanisms of accountability: organizations do not have an obligation to respond to any and all
press stories, academic articles, or reports by NGOs that may damage their reputations.58 And
there are instances where organizations may rationally choose to “ride out” reputational damage and not change their practices. For example, a ﬁrm that is getting bad press about the labor
practices in its supply chain may choose to ignore that media coverage if its shareholders
remain happy.59
While the public’s attention may be short-lived or sporadic, for international organizations, member states are an especially important audience. International organizations’ governance mechanisms assure that member states will continue to pay attention to the
organization for the long term. Of course, these member states will not always agree or act
in concert.60 Especially when member states disagree, international civil servants will have to
make choices about which states to heed. These ofﬁcials may have particularly strong incentives to be responsive to particular states or subsets of states—especially those states that
52

See, e.g., infra note 289.
For a formal model demonstrating this point for private ﬁrms, see Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyce Deb, What Is a
Good Reputation? Career Concerns with Heterogeneous Audiences, 34 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 44 (2014). See also FINE,
supra note 42, at 170, 189 (identifying strategies for managing the predicaments created by multiple audiences).
54
Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott & Eric W. Wehrly, The Reputational Penalties for Environmental
Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J. L. & ECON. 653, 655 (2005).
55
Id. at 656–66.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 668.
58
Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance, 108 AJIL 211, 253–54 (2014)
(rejecting the view that reputation is an accountability mechanism because, in his view, accountability mechanisms
all involve a right to demand an accounting and to invoke a remedy, and an obligation on the part of the organization to render an account); Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AJIL 1, 45 (2016) (pointing
out that reputation costs do not ensure responsiveness on the part of the United Nations).
59
VOGEL, supra note 12, at 70–71, 77–82 (describing Nike’s shifting responses to criticisms of its labor practices
by NGOs and the press).
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See infra text accompanying notes 80–83 (describing some competing priorities that inﬂuence the positions
and decisions that states take with respect to international organizations).
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supply key resources to the organization.61 These states are in positions rather like a private
ﬁrm’s big shareholders. The resources they supply include, most obviously, funding. But
there are other kinds of resources too. For the United Nations, peacekeepers are another
resource that is constantly in high demand.62 Put in terms of reputation, the states that provide such resources are likely to be an especially important audience of international
organizations.
In some cases too, member states are in a position akin to the customers of an international
organization. For example, the World Bank lends to middle-income countries on terms that
are slightly better than what is available on the private market. The interest that these countries pay on their loans is an important source of funding for the Bank’s operations, and makes
the Bank less dependent on its member states.63 At the same time, these countries have access
to private-sector loans as well. If dealing with the Bank is unattractive, they have the option to
turn elsewhere. As a result, the Bank is quite careful to maintain its appeal to these borrowing
states.64
By contrast, those member states that desperately need services and assistance from international organizations may be a less important audience. These states may need to maintain a
good relationship with the organizations even more than the organizations need to maintain a
good relationship with them. Thus, for example, as evidence started mounting that UN
peacekeepers were the source of the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti, the Haitian government
went out of its way to protect and shield the United Nations, and generally refrained from
making strong demands on the organization to provide recourse to Haitian victims.65
It is also important to remember that an organization’s audiences are not hermetically
sealed from one another. Reconsider the example of the ﬁrm whose labor practices are the
target of NGO and media criticism. The general public may include many actual and potential consumers of that corporation’s product. If those consumers change their purchasing
decisions, then the shareholders will see an effect.66 By extension, when an international organization’s reputation in the general public suffers, government ofﬁcials may become less willing to support the organization ﬁnancially and otherwise, less willing to follow its
recommendations, or more reluctant to turn to the organization to address new problems
—preferring to work through other international organizations or forums, or perhaps
through domestic agencies instead.67

61
In addition, individual ofﬁcials may be inclined to be responsive to the views of their states of nationality. See
infra note 72.
62
See, e.g., Ban Ki-moon, Cyril Foster Lecture, University of Oxford: “Human Protection and the 21st Century
United Nations” (Feb. 2, 2011), available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2011-02-02/cyrilfoster-lecture-oxford-university-human-protection-and-21st (“Securing the required resources and [peacekeeping] troops has consumed much of my energy. I have been begging leaders to make resources available to us.”).
63
Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AJIL 517 (2013).
64
See generally CATHERINE WEAVER, HYPOCRISY TRAP (2008) (describing this dynamic).
65
Daugirdas 2014, supra note 14, at 1002 (describing NGOs making demands that the Haitian government
was unable or unwilling to make); Daugirdas 2019, supra note 14.
66
VOGEL, supra note 12 at 47–56, 73–74.
67
Cf. CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 54 (“As a general hypothesis, we may venture the statement that when all
things are considered, the more legitimate, expert, and effective a regulator is perceived to be, the more likely politicians will be to create new regulations in policy areas that the regulator governs, and the more likely politicians
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3. Multiplicity of individuals and entities with reputations
There is one last multiplicity that complicates reputational dynamics. The discussion so
far has treated international organizations as unitary and discrete entities. In reality, they
are neither.68 Organizations are made up of individuals, and those individuals have reputations and interests that are, to varying degrees, distinct from those of the institution itself.69
Individuals often identify, at least to some degree, with the organizations for which they
work.70 Their identiﬁcation may motivate them to seek to protect the organization’s reputation.71 At the same time, individuals who work for an organization have their own separate
reputations to protect, even when doing so comes at the organization’s expense.72
Going still further, organizations are often divided into units and subunits. Reputations
may attach to those nested units in addition to attaching to individuals within them.
Consider the FDA. Reputations can and do attach to the scientists who work for the
FDA, the FDA’s enforcement division, the FDA itself, the executive branch of the government (or the administration of a particular president), and the federal government in its
entirety (the “Feds”). For the United Nations, reputations can attach to individual ofﬁces,
programs, or organs (such as the Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Refugees, or the
UN Security Council), to the UN Secretariat as whole, to the organization as deﬁned by
the UN Charter, and to the entire UN System, which includes the specialized agencies
and other related organizations as well as the United Nations itself.73
Reputation, thus, can simultaneously attach to multiple individuals and entities that make
up an organization, and sometimes to entities that extend beyond the formal legal boundaries
of the organization. This feature of reputation is important because these individuals and entities may disagree about the amount of weight or signiﬁcance to accord to any particular
dimension of reputation—and may disagree about how much weight to put on the actual
or anticipated response of any particular audience member.
Sometimes actors seek to take advantage of the multiple possibilities for locating the boundary lines around an organization.74 They might strategically push the salient boundary line
68

Id. at 50.
Johnstone, supra note 14, at 237 (“The Managing Director of the IMF and President of the World Bank have
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70
CARPENTER, supra note 13, at 43, 47–51 (observing that the idea that human beings are motivated by esteem
is long held—and that “the identity and esteem of an individual often depend upon wider social evaluations of the
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Id. at 48–49 (citing psychological literature that “under conditions of a public threat to an organization’s
identity—a scandal or an observable episode of poor performance—less attached members may exit the organization, whereas more attached members may exhibit a combination of defensive and corrective behavior”). See also
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lapses” by various kinds of organizations).
72
For example, individual IO ofﬁcials may be particularly eager to cultivate reputations for responsiveness to
their governments of nationality, perhaps because they are thinking about future job prospects within foreign ministries. See Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution
and Its Critics, 103 AJIL 209, 231 (2009) (quoting a former UN under-secretary general for writing: “A senior UN
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further out in order to claim credit. For example, President Clinton, facing a hostile
Republican Congress for most of his presidency, deliberately sought to establish personal
ownership over the regulatory activity of executive branch agencies.75 In other words, he
sought to extend the relevant reputational boundary beyond the White House and to inscribe
key administrative agencies within it. On the ﬂip side, corporations presented with information about harsh labor practices among their suppliers may seek to disavow responsibility,
seeking to shift blame by drawing the relevant boundary closer in. Nike initially took that
approach in response to a news story broadcast on CBS in 1993 describing how workers
in Indonesia were paid nineteen cents per hour and permitted to leave the company barracks
only on Sundays.76
In focusing on “the United Nations,” this Article draws the boundary line around the UN
Secretariat, focusing on the secretary-general and international civil servants as the key actors
and characterizing the member states as an especially important audience for the United
Nations. As demonstrated in the sections that follow, the UN Secretariat can (and does)
take independent steps either expressly designed to protect the organization’s reputation—
or which have the consequence of affecting the organization’s reputation.
To be sure, the United Nations faces some constraints on its choices and its capacity to
shape its reputation. But this feature does not make the United Nations unique, or even
unusual: organizations and people alike operate under constraints. Consider again private
ﬁrms contemplating how much they will do to raise labor standards or protect the environment. Their choices are seriously constrained by the market: if they are overly ambitious
when it comes to corporate social responsibility, they may drive themselves out of business.77 States too are constrained when it comes to shaping their reputations. For example,
some states might prefer to cultivate reputations for complying with international law while
lacking the capacity to do so; this possibility looms large in the design of compliance mechanisms for many treaties.78 The question in each case is how these organizations and entities
exercise the discretion that they do have.
A comprehensive account of reputational dynamics would also need to consider more carefully when and why member states seek to preserve and enhance the reputations of the international organizations in which they participate. There are many examples of member states
expressing such concerns and, in addition, acting to preserve the organizations’ reputations
and legitimacy.79 But states have competing priorities, and these competing priorities may
cause them to take steps that hamper international organizations’ ability to protect their reputations. One such competing priority is limiting the organization’s overall expenditures—a
particular concern for member states that provide signiﬁcant funds.80 Another is the desire to
75
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protect the state’s (or government’s) own reputation.81 Separately, states vary in their willingness to challenge conduct by international organizations that, in their own view, fails to live
up to core values. Some will be eager to do so, perhaps welcoming opportunities to speak truth
to power.82 Other states—especially those that depend upon assistance from the United
Nations—may be particularly disinclined to challenge it.83 The motivations of individual
states—and how they add up to collective action or inaction by the intergovernmental organs
of international organizations—remain a topic for future study.
II. PROBLEMATIC RESPONSES TO REPUTATIONAL THREATS
Having considered when organizations may be motivated to protect their reputations—
and which dimension of their reputation they are seeking to safeguard—this Part considers
how organizations respond to reputational damage. Those responses will not always be salutary, and they may even be harmful. In particular, this Part addresses the possibility that organizations will respond to reputational damage (or the threat of such damage) by doing something
other than directly and forcefully remedying the source of actual or potential reputational damage.84 Put another way, reputations are built on the perceptions and beliefs of an organization’s
audiences.85 Organizations may seek to address reputational damage by focusing on appearances
rather than reality. The observation that an organization might do something “merely” to
improve its public image captures the idea that efforts undertaken to avoid or to remedy reputational damage may not reﬂect a sincere or vigorous effort to solve the underlying problem.
A. Symbolic or Cosmetic Responses
Some forty years ago, two sociologists, John Meyer and Brian Rowan, sought to explain
persistent gaps between organizations’ formal structures—that is, their organizational charts,
express goals, and adopted policies and procedures—and the way that the organizations actually operate on the ground.86 Meyer and Rowan argued that organizations face considerable
pressure to adopt various formal structures. Such structures may be legally required, a source
of social prestige, or standard operating procedures in a professional community. These formal structures contribute to the legitimacy of an organization and help it survive—but not by
helping the organization produce its output more efﬁciently. Thus, for example:
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The rise of professionalized economics makes it useful for organizations to incorporate
groups of economists and econometric analyses. Though no one may read, understand,
or believe them, econometric analyses help legitimate the organization’s plans in the eyes
of investors, customers (as with Defense Department contractors), and internal participants. Such analyses can also provide rational accountings after failures occur: managers
whose plans have failed can demonstrate to investors, stockholders, and superiors that
procedures were prudent and that decisions were made by rational means.87
When there is a tension or conﬂict between the formal structures and the logic of efﬁciency,
Meyer and Rowan argue that organizations may respond by “decoupling” the formal structures from the organization’s ongoing activities. That is, organizations will adopt the formal
structures needed to legitimate the institution, but they may simultaneously insulate their onthe-ground operations from those formal structures. An organization might, for example,
adopt equal opportunity hiring procedures on paper while tacitly facilitating noncompliance
by declining to collect information about whether and how the policy has been
implemented.88
Meyer and Rowan do not frame their account in terms of reputation, but other scholars
have taken this step. Drawing on Meyer and Rowan’s work, the authors of a quantitative
study of corporate ethics programs examined the circumstances under which companies
adopted easily decoupled policies—i.e., policies that “provide[] the appearance of conformity
to external expectations while making it easy to insulate much of the organization from those
expectations.”89 The study found that corporations that adopted ethics programs in response
to critical media attention were especially likely to choose easily decoupled policies.90 The
authors expected this result: on the one hand, the targeted corporations would feel a need
to placate their critics;91 on the other hand, the media’s demands would “not necessarily
reﬂect real problems or mesh well with organizational goals.”92 This combination could
make easily decoupled policies especially attractive to the corporation’s managers.
More recently, sociologists Michael Sauder and Gary Alan Fine observed a similar dynamic
in how business schools responded to rankings produced by U.S. News and World Report and
other media publications.93 Because the rankings play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the reputation of these institutions—and therefore in attracting students—the stakes are quite high.
Business schools respond by “play[ing] to the test”—that is, making various changes, some
real and others cosmetic, in order to maximize their scores on various rankings.94
87
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Other scholars have applied this theoretical approach to international organizations,
describing how they engage in “organized hypocrisy” to cope with conﬂicting demands
from member states and others, including NGOs.95 Especially important is Catherine
Weaver’s in-depth study of the World Bank’s anti-corruption agenda.96 In 1996, James
Wolfensohn, the Bank’s president, gave a speech touting the Bank’s commitment to “deal
with the cancer of corruption.”97 Weaver documents how, over the next year, the World
Bank did take steps to advance this anti-corruption agenda. These included issuing a new
strategy report, hiring more ﬁnancial managers and procurement specialists, setting up a
new internal investigative unit and a twenty-four-hour hotline for reporting corruption,
and establishing a “sanctions committee” to punish companies and individuals found guilty
of bribery and graft.98
Evidence that Wolfensohn’s anti-corruption agenda actually changed the Bank’s core lending activity is much scarcer, however, as Weaver shows. Middle-income countries that borrowed from the Bank were not keen on the anti-corruption agenda, and the Bank was eager to
keep them happy because the interest these countries paid was a key source of the Bank’s
ﬁnancial independence.99 Individual staff members continued to face incentives to make
big loans and make them quickly.100 But taking anti-corruption seriously meant provoking
confrontations with member states and possibly cancelling loans—or else investing in governance and institutional development projects, which entailed smaller loans, required far more
staff time, and involved politically sensitive and contentious negotiations.101 Under these circumstances, it is easy to see how a gap between rhetoric and on-the-ground practice—organized hypocrisy—could emerge.
B. Suppressing Damaging Information
As a logical matter, only information that becomes known outside an organization can
harm its reputation.102 One strategy for protecting reputation, then, is to hide damaging
information.103 While all organizations may be tempted by this approach, the temptation
95
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103
Cf. GUZMAN, supra note 11, at 96 (“Needless to say, a violation of international law generates a reputational
sanction only if some other country knows about the violation. It follows that a violation will lead to a smaller
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is worth highlighting here because good reputations are so important to international organizations—and because international organizations have at their disposal a broad array of
tools that can help them to conceal derogatory information.
Among the most important tools that allow international organizations to shield harmful information are treaty-based privileges and immunities. International organizations,
including the United Nations, often have comprehensive immunities from all forms
of legal process.104 In addition, the organizations’ premises and archives are
inviolable.105 This inviolability allows organizations to preclude outsiders—including journalists and government ofﬁcials—from accessing their premises without permission.
Inviolability also makes it impossible for outsiders to legally force the disclosure of any information or documents about the organization.
International organizations also have signiﬁcant discretion and control when it comes to
the production of information. Of particular import for sexual violence, international organizations make choices about whether to pursue investigations at all and what kinds of
resources to devote to such investigations. By choosing not to initiate investigations, or by
limiting their scope, international organizations may be in a position to avoid uncovering
information about discreditable actions.106 If no such information is uncovered, then
there is nothing to hide.
Such investigations (or the absence thereof) matter because, in general, information (both
positive and negative) about international organizations’ operational work is often hard to
come by. International organizations frequently work in places that are relatively difﬁcult
to access, thereby making their work difﬁcult to observe. This is certainly true of UN
peace operations, which usually involve deployments to volatile and dangerous situations.
There are some important limits, or checks, on international organizations’ ability to control information about their activities. Sometimes outsiders are able to develop a detailed
account of activities without cooperation from the organization itself. Thus, for example,
when a cholera outbreak began in Haiti in 2010, intrepid journalists and epidemiologists
quickly uncovered facts that challenged the United Nations’ denial of any role in the outbreak.107 The United Nations’ unwillingness to develop or share key pieces of information
slowed down their efforts, but did not stop them.108
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Sometimes insiders help outsiders overcome both obstacles by leaking information.
Ofﬁcials leak information for many different reasons.109 Individuals who are troubled by
what they see inside their organizations—and see potential allies in outside NGOs who are
agitating for change—may view leaks as a mechanism to promote internal change.110
Such leakers, however, may face disciplinary action. To put it mildly, organizations do not
always treat leakers—or whistleblowers—as heroes. Over the years, many newspaper stories
have described UN ofﬁcials who were penalized for shedding light on problems.111 It is
important to take such press accounts with several grains of salt, however. The invocation
of the “whistleblower” mantle is often contested, and so too is the characterization of adverse
employment consequences as “retaliation.” There is more than one side to each story, and the
sources on which journalists rely for their reporting may reveal a limited or distorted account.
Nevertheless, the basic point stands that punishing staff who reveal damaging information to
the public is a troubling way that organizations can seek to avoid reputational harm. In recent
years, international organizations have adopted rules and regulations to provide more robust
protections to whistleblowers.112 But allegations of retaliation against whistleblowers remain
quite common,113 and international organizations’ immunities keep national courts from
hearing and perhaps vindicating whistleblowers’ claims.
There are also examples of UN ofﬁcials suppressing damaging information about member
states in order to avoid conﬂicts with those member states. In 2014, a former spokesperson
went to the press with allegations that UNAMID, a hybrid African Union and UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur, was underreporting instances of the Sudanese government deliberately
targeting Sudanese civilians and UNAMID peacekeepers.114 A subsequent investigation initiated by the secretary-general conﬁrmed that the mission withheld information from the
media and—more remarkably—even from ofﬁcials at UN headquarters in New York.115
109
David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013).
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hours”).
111
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http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/16/u-n-sex-crimes-whistle-blower-wrongfully-dismissed (“Madeleine Rees, a
former UN human rights ofﬁcial and the inspiration for one of the heroines in the ﬁlm The Whistleblower, was
wrongfully dismissed from her job with the Geneva-based UN Ofﬁce of the High Commission for Human Rights
in March 2010, according to a ruling by the United Nations’ administrative disputes tribunal.”); Colum Lynch,
U.N. Whistleblower: Expose Corruption at Your Own Peril, FOR. POL’Y (Mar. 19, 2013), at http://foreignpolicy.
com/2013/03/19/u-n-whistleblower-expose-corruption-at-your-own-peril (describing decision by UN tribunal
awarding $65,000 in compensation to an American whistleblower, James Wasserstrom, who says that he was
forced from his UN job in Kosovo after cooperating in an internal investigation of corruption by UN ofﬁcials).
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Colum Lynch, “They Just Stood Watching,” FOR. POL’Y (Apr. 7, 2014), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/
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UN Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Review of
UNAMID Reporting (Oct. 29, 2014), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-10-29/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-review-unamid (documenting ﬁve instances where “the Mission
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Fear evidently motivated this self-censorship, at least in part. The UNAMID mission had, in
recent years, been subjected to more lethal attacks than any other UN peacekeeping mission,
and UNAMID ofﬁcials reportedly worried that if the United Nations criticized the Sudanese
government, the government would engage in reprisals against the peacekeepers.116 As Hervé
Ladsous, then the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, put it:
In every mission there is a tension between the necessity to preserve the consent and good
will of the host government required to allow our peacekeepers to do their jobs and sometimes contradictory imperative to report accurately and candidly on any and all incidents
of violence. . . . Bad relations with the host government can make it impossible for a mission to operate—to move around the country, to have their equipment cleared by
national customs, to deploy new personnel.117
In short, as explained in Part I, international organizations have strong incentives to maintain
reputations for cooperativeness with member states that supply key resources. This incident
involving UNAMID shows that concealing negative information regarding those member
states is one way to do it.
III. THE UNITED NATIONS’ HANDLING OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE ALLEGATIONS IN THE CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC
As described in the introduction, the United Nations’ handling of allegations of sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse in the Central African Republic has been the source of signiﬁcant reputational damage—and both government and UN ofﬁcials have proclaimed their
intention to repair that damage. In order to illustrate and deepen the theoretical account
of reputational dynamics provided above, this Part takes a closer look at developments in
the Central African Republic and the United Nations’ key decisions before and shortly
after The Guardian sparked widespread interest and attention.
This case study demonstrates some of the constraints under which the UN Secretariat
operates when it seeks to preserve its reputation. Most signiﬁcantly, the United Nations cannot itself prosecute individual perpetrators. Only the government of the individual’s nationality can do so. That said, the Secretariat can inﬂuence whether or not governments take such
actions. The Secretariat has more tools at its disposal with respect to UN peacekeepers than it
does with respect to forces that, like the French forces in the Central African Republic (known
as Sangaris), are under uniﬁed command. Importantly, though, with respect to both sets of
actors, UN ofﬁcials have choices about how often, how forcefully, and how publicly to
took an unduly conservative approach to the media, maintaining silence when it could have developed a press line,
even in the absence of all the facts”).
116
Colum Lynch, U.N. Whistleblower Decries “Cover-Up of a Cover-Up” Over Darfur Debacle, FOR. POL’Y (Oct.
29, 2014), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/29/u-n-whistleblower-decries-cover-up-of-a-cover-up-over-darfur-debacle.
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Lynch, supra note 114. For other examples of the United Nations’ underreporting violations by a government in order to retain the support of that government for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, see Report of
the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, Nov. 2012, available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf;
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pressure governments to pursue criminal prosecution. The Secretariat also has discretion over
whether and how to facilitate and support criminal investigations by those governments.
The account that emerges is one of the UN Secretariat declining to take key steps that
would have avoided or mitigated the reputational damage the organization eventually
faced. The failure to avoid yet another sexual abuse scandal and the accompanying media
ﬁrestorm would seem to support the view that the United Nations is insensitive to reputational costs. In this sense, events in the Central Africa Republic offer a “critical case”118 for
evaluating the effectiveness of reputation as a disciplinarian.
A. The United Nations’ Involvement in the Central African Republic
While its roots are deep, the current crisis in the Central African Republic can be traced
back to December 2012, when the Séléka, a Muslim rebel group, launched a series of attacks
and began marching towards Bangui, the capital.119 They eventually seized Bangui and established a brutal and abusive regime.120 Seeking to counter the Séléka, a group of former members of the security forces established the mainly Christian anti-Balaka movement and took
up arms and killed many people.121 The violence took on increasingly sectarian overtones.122
In 2013, the Security Council authorized the deployment of two different forces to the
Central African Republic. The ﬁrst force was the “Africa-led International Support
Mission in the CAR,” known as MISCA, which had been established by the African
Union.123 The Security Council charged MISCA with contributing to “the protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order” and to “the stabilization [of] the country
and the restoration of State authority over the whole territory of the country.”124 Separately,
the Security Council authorized the French forces in the Central African Republic “to take all
necessary measures to support MISCA in the discharge of its mandate.”125 This mission
became known as Operation Sangaris. Like traditional UN peacekeepers, MISCA and the
French forces operated with the consent of the Central African Republic. But unlike traditional peacekeepers, they did not wear blue helmets or other UN insignia, nor were they
under UN command. Instead, they were under the “uniﬁed command” of the African
Union and France, respectively.126
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Although MISCA and the French forces had some early successes, the situation on the
ground in the Central African Republic deteriorated.127 In January 2014, a high-level UN
ofﬁcial warned that “the seeds are there, for a genocide,” elaborating that the Central
African Republic “has all the elements that we have seen elsewhere, in places like Rwanda
and Bosnia.”128 The secretary-general recommended replacing MISCA and the French forces
with a UN peacekeeping force, on the theory that such a force would be better suited than the
French and African Union forces “to address the deep-rooted nature of the complex crisis now
unfolding in the Central African Republic.”129 The Security Council implemented this
recommendation, establishing the MINUSCA peacekeeping force to replace MISCA in
September 2014.130
In May 2014—while the French and MISCA forces were still on the ground in the Central
African Republic, and before the MINUSCA forces were constituted—UN ofﬁcials in Bangui
heard from the head of a local NGO that some foreign military troops had subjected children
to sexual acts in exchange for food or money in the vicinity of the nearby M’Poko Internally
Displaced Persons Camp.131 Between May 19 and June 24, Gallianne Palayret, a human
rights ofﬁcer temporarily deployed to the UN ofﬁce in Bangui, together with the UN
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) protection ofﬁcers, interviewed six children, all boys between eight and eleven years old.132 Three boys told Palayret that they had
performed oral sex on French Sangaris soldiers in exchange for food and money.133 A fourth
boy, nine years old, told her that he was about to do the same but stopped after being seen by
another child, who alerted others.134 The ﬁfth and sixth boys interviewed said they had witnessed other boys perform oral sex in exchange for food or money.135 The sixth boy, eleven
years old, also reported that two of those boys had also been raped on other occasions.136
A leaked copy of Palayret’s interview notes—coupled with an account of the organization’s
lackadaisical response to the allegations—formed the core of Sandra Laville’s article in The
Guardian, published at the end of April 2015.137 According to Laville’s news story, the
only person against whom the organization moved forcefully was Anders Kompass, the whistleblower who brought the allegations to the attention of the French government.138
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Two months later, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed an independent panel to
review the United Nations’ response to the allegations against the Sangaris.139 The panel
report (hereinafter CAR Panel Report), released in December 2015, excoriated the United
Nations’ handling of the allegations:
[I]nformation about the Allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across
multiple United Nations ofﬁces, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the
serious human rights violations. . . . The welfare of the victims and the accountability of
the perpetrators appeared to be an afterthought, if considered at all. Overall, the response
of the UN was fragmented and bureaucratic, and failed to satisfy the core mandate of the
United Nation to address human rights violations.140
Meanwhile, the allegations did not lead to any prosecutions in French courts. In
December 2015, four French soldiers were formally detained and interrogated.141 Just
over a year later, a panel of French judges made a preliminary decision not to seek charges
against the Sangaris soldiers accused of sexually abusing children.142 In January 2018,
magistrates in France closed the investigations and dismissed any prospect of a trial, citing
insufﬁcient evidence.143
Separate from these allegations against the French Sangaris, once MINUSCA was established, the United Nations faced a separate crisis involving sexual violence by UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. That there was a problem—and that its severity was
unusual—was revealed little by little. After The Guardian story broke, the United Nations
became more forthcoming about additional allegations. During the summer of 2015, the
press covered news of allegations against peacekeepers in the Central African Republic,
some but not all of which involved sexual violence.144
On August 12, Babacar Gaye, the special representative for the secretary-general in the
Central African Republic and the head of the MINUSCA ofﬁce in Bangui, resigned at the
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request of the secretary-general.145 The UN spokesperson explained that the request was
“based on the repeated number of cases of sexual abuse and misconduct that have taken
place in the Central African Republic.”146 The spokesperson provided no further detail,
but described the resignation as “unprecedented,”147 relating that he had not seen anything
like it during his ﬁfteen years at the United Nations.148
Within days of Gaye’s resignation, still more rape allegations against MINUSCA peacekeepers were reported.149 The United Nations did not directly identify the nationalities of the
accused, but a UN spokesperson indicated that the rapes took place in a market town
where peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had been serving.150
It later became clear that including troops and police from the DRC in MINUSCA was
quite controversial within the UN Secretariat from the beginning because a UN report
authored by the secretary-general had identiﬁed the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC)
among parties that “recruit and use children” and that “commit rape and other forms of sexual
violence against children.”151 Although some UN ofﬁcials objected, the Secretariat ultimately
made the decision to include in MINUSCA an infantry battalion and a formed police unit
from the DRC.152
Subsequent developments revealed that concerns about the DRC troops and police were
warranted. On January 8, 2016, the UN spokesperson announced that a contingent from the
DRC currently deployed in MINUSCA would be “repatriated without replacement.”153
Although the United Nations did not acknowledge it immediately, it later became clear
that the DRC’s deﬁcient response to numerous sexual violence allegations prompted the
repatriation.154
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B. Reputational Multiplicities and the UN’s Response to Developments in the Central African
Republic
The reputational damage inﬂicted on the United Nations in the wake of revelations concerning the Sangaris and UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic was hardly unpredictable. So why run the risk of such grave damage to the organization by sitting on the
allegations against the Sangaris and by accepting peacekeepers from the DRC in light of
their military’s abysmal track record on sexual violence—a fact publicized by the United
Nations itself?155 Reputational multiplicities can help to explain actions or policies on the
part of certain UN ofﬁcials that initially appear somewhat puzzling.
1. Initial handling of the allegations against the Sangaris
Once the United Nations ofﬁce in Bangui learned about the allegations against the French
soldiers, it did not act quickly to escalate the matter within the United Nations. The CAR
Panel Report faulted Renner Onana, who was at the time the head of the Human Rights and
Justice Section of the MINUSCA ofﬁce in Bangui.156 The Report criticized Onana’s failure to
take urgent action to halt further abuse, to identify the perpetrators, and to ensure that they
were held accountable.157 Rather than pulling ﬁre alarms and insisting that the allegations get
high-level attention, the Report said, Onana downplayed the allegations. He never wrote a
report focused speciﬁcally on the allegations; instead, Onana included descriptions of them in
two other reports where they did not obviously belong.158
The CAR Panel Report suggests two motivations for Onana’s handling of the allegations. When he ﬁrst shared news of the allegations with Gaye in May 2014, Onana
expressed his concern that “disclosure of the Allegations would seriously harm the mission
and destroy the trust of the local population in the international forces.”159 Onana was
thinking of the organization’s reputation in the eyes of the community in which the
United Nations was operating. Of course, the “local population” that Onana had in
mind implicitly excluded the victims of the Sangaris soldiers and those who are close to
them. Their estimation of the United Nations was surely not improved by downplaying
or ignoring the allegations. One might also criticize Onana for misjudging how to best
preserve the organization’s reputation in the broader local community. Efforts to protect
reputation require predictions about how others will react, and those predictions will not
always be correct. In this case, forthrightly acknowledging the allegations—and focusing
on an appropriate response, including care for the victims and investigation of the
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perpetrators—may have been the best way to show respect for the local community and to
regain some good will.160
Second, Onana explained in his statement to the panel that he considered the allegations
extremely politically sensitive because of his personal experience, just two months prior, dealing with allegations of human rights violations involving MISCA forces from Chad.161 At the
end of March 2014, Chadian soldiers that were part of MISCA had ﬁred on a crowd in the
suburb of Begoua, allegedly killing twenty-four people and injuring about one hundred.162
Some reports indicated that the soldiers had ﬁred indiscriminately and without provocation.163 The Chadian government was furious when the United Nations publicly addressed
the allegations, and painted itself as the victim of a “gratuitous and malicious campaign.”164
Within a week, the Chadian government announced that it was withdrawing eight hundred
troops from the Central African Republic.165 That withdrawal had serious practical consequences: Chadian troops had been instrumental in helping to evacuate Muslims threatened
by violence in the country.166 Onana worried that the French government might react in a
similar way to news of the allegations against the Sangaris.167 Finding replacements would
have been especially difﬁcult because, for troops not under UN command, the organization
usually takes a “costs lie where they fall” approach—that is, the expenses for such missions are
typically borne by the participating member states.168
In short, Onana viewed the allegations as potentially threatening the United Nations’ relationship with the French government. Put another way, Onana saw a risk to the organization’s reputation for cooperativeness with a state that was a supplier of key resources in the
Central African Republic—and also a permanent member of the Security Council. And a
damaged relationship with France could threaten the effectiveness of the peace operation
on the ground. On this point too, Onana may have misjudged the reaction of the French
government. Gallianne Palayret, who sought a meeting with the French forces after concluding the ﬁrst interview, described their reaction in positive terms, saying they took the allegations seriously.169 Later, when Anders Kompass shared the allegations with high-level French
160
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diplomats in Geneva and New York, the French government immediately sent a team of
investigators to the Central African Republic.170 After the story in The Guardian, thenFrench President Francois Hollande said: “If some soldiers have behaved badly, I will
show no mercy.”171 A joint statement from the foreign and defense ministries underscored
this view: “The defence ministry has taken and will take all necessary measures to ensure the
truth comes out. . . . If proved true, it will ensure that the toughest sanctions are imposed on
those responsible for what would be a terrible breach of the values of a soldier.”172 In a subsequent statement, Hollande acknowledged that France’s own reputation was on the line:
We cannot—and I cannot—accept the least stain on the reputation of our armed forces
—that is to say, on the reputation of France. It would be the honor of France that would
be engaged, and that is why the greatest commitment to the truth and against impunity
must be expressed today by the head of state personally.173
These public reactions suggest that the allegations did not threaten the relationship between
the United Nations and France, as Onana feared. Hollande’s comments about France’s reputation are particularly telling. He clearly perceived a risk to the country’s reputation—but
the source of the reputational damage would be the impunity of the perpetrators.
Of course, at the time that Onana was acting, he did not know how the French would
react. In his response to the external panel report, Onana suggested that his desire to avoid
a confrontation with the French government was not idiosyncratic; in fact, he maintained
such a view was widespread within the United Nations, and an important reason for the organization’s desultory response to the allegations against the Sangaris:
Rather than scapegoat [me] for failure to act, I strongly ascribe this to a system failure,
given that nobody from the [head of mission] to NY and Geneva wanted to take the full
responsibility for necessary action for fear that the allegations involved a powerful P5
member of the [Security Council].174
This apparent organizational imperative to maintain a reputation for cooperativeness with
member states aligns with the micro-level incentives that individual UN employees face.
Picking ﬁghts with member states is not generally a good way for UN ofﬁcials to advance
their careers within the organization.175 Individual ofﬁcials may be particularly reluctant
170
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to provoke such confrontations in cases where they deem the allegations not very
serious.176
There was, however, one high-level ofﬁcial who was willing to publicly criticize the French
government’s handling of the allegations against the Sangaris—the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein. Shortly after The Guardian story was published, Al-Hussein gave a press conference during which he repeatedly asked why France had
not investigated its own soldiers in the months before the United Nations’ own investigation:
How is it that nobody knew about these abuses between December and May [when the
alleged conduct occurred]? . . . If you have a fever for ﬁve months, you don’t need a doctor
to come in at the ﬁfth month to tell you you’re not well.177
Al-Hussein may have been more willing than other UN ofﬁcials to confront the French
government because of his particular position. The UN High Commissioner is selected for
his or her expertise and commitment to human rights.178 Al-Hussein saw his willingness to
confront member states as central to fulﬁlling his obligations. In December 2017, he
announced that he would not seek a second term, explaining that doing so “in the current
geopolitical context . . . might involve bending a knee in supplication; muting a statement of
advocacy; lessening the independence and integrity of my voice . . . .”179 In reputational
terms, Al-Hussein appeared to focus on his personal reputation and that of his ofﬁce rather
than the United Nations in its entirety.
A focus on the mission—and by extension the reputation—of a particular unit rather than
the organization as a whole can also help to explain the reluctance of individuals within the
Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to aid French investigators
once they arrived in Bangui. Whether the perpetrators of sexual violence face criminal prosecution and punishment is a central question for evaluating the United Nations’ overall handling of allegations of sexual violence. But it is less central to the mission and culture of
OHCHR, whose ofﬁcials focus more on protecting victims and harbor signiﬁcant doubts
about the sincerity and quality of member states’ criminal investigations. The OHCHR ofﬁcials who spoke with the members of the Panel repeatedly emphasized the principle of “do no
harm,” and the victims’ and witnesses’ rights to privacy, conﬁdentiality, and informed
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consent.180 Al-Hussein even suggested that there were no circumstances in which it would
have been appropriate for Kompass to share with French diplomats the names of the alleged
victims because it was “virtually impossible” for those children to provide their prior informed
consent to sharing such information.181 Along similar lines, Renner Onana, the head of the
MINUSCA Human Rights and Justice Ofﬁce, suggested that the French investigators who
arrived in August 2014, were decidedly unwelcome. He described the investigators as “endanger[ing]” the victims and “severely compromis[ing]” the efforts that his ofﬁce and UNICEF
had made to protect them.182 Onana did not elaborate, so it is unclear whether there are particular features of the investigation or simply the very fact of it that he found troubling. The
point stands, though, that there is some tension between OHCHR’s focus on protecting victims and the broader organization’s interest in ensuring that perpetrators of sexual violence do
not evade accountability through national criminal justice proceedings.
2. Accepting troops from the DRC
The importance to the United Nations overall of maintaining a cooperative relationship
with key member states also featured in the decision by the UN Secretariat to accept peacekeepers from the DRC notwithstanding the known risks associated with those troops. To
start, when the Security Council created MINUSCA, it speciﬁcally asked the Secretariat “to
include in MINUSCA as many MISCA military and police personnel as possible and in line
with United Nations standards.”183 Troops from the DRC were participating in MISCA.
Categorically excluding DRC troops from MINUSCA would have put the organization
(and individual ofﬁcials) in a position of snubbing a member state, and perhaps subjected
it to complaints that the Secretariat was disregarding the Security Council’s speciﬁc
instructions.
For the Secretariat, another challenge to implementing the Security Council’s resolution
was simply ﬁnding enough soldiers to do the job—and ﬁnding them quickly. As reported by
the press:
Hervé Ladsous, the United Nations’ under secretary general for peacekeeping, said he
was aware of the risks of deploying the battalion from the Democratic Republic of
Congo, but he was also under orders from the Security Council to mobilize a large, robust
force to prevent mass atrocities in the Central African Republic. . . .
“In peacekeeping, the hard reality is that there is a constant tension between the need to
deploy peacekeepers quickly to stabilize a fragile situation and the requirement to ensure
that only the highest quality troops are sent to implement our mandated tasks,” Mr.
Ladsous said in an email. “The U.N. has no forces of its own, and is dependent on
the member states to provide professional forces at a high state of readiness.”184
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Similar concerns delayed the repatriation of the DRC contingent. After the repatriation decision in January 2017, “Mr. Ladsous insisted that they remain for more than a month, arguing
that the risk of violence around the Central African Republic’s February election was too high
to pull out an entire battalion.”185
In general, ﬁnding the peacekeeping troops to implement the mandates that the Security
Council writes is a difﬁcult job for the Secretariat. In recent decades, as peacekeeping missions
have grown more numerous and less safe, the job has become even harder. The countries that
participate in peacekeeping missions receive ﬁnancial compensation for personnel and equipment at rates set by the General Assembly, but this compensation is not enough to close the
gap between supply and demand for peacekeepers. Unlike the salary scales for UN ofﬁcials,
which are designed to make those jobs attractive and competitive across the entire world, the
reimbursement rates for peacekeepers are set at a fairly low level: for example, troop-contributing countries are reimbursed at a rate of $1,410 per soldier per month.186 Some poorer
states may realize ﬁnancial gains from supplying peacekeepers. For wealthier member states,
however, these rates mean that supplying peacekeepers necessarily involves a sizeable in-kind
voluntary contribution.
The pressure to meet the demand for peacekeepers, coupled with the desire to avoid confrontation with member states, has sometimes caused the organization to accept troop and
police contingents that fail to meet the United Nations’ own standards.187 Parfait
Onanga-Anyanga, who replaced Babacar Gaye as the head of the UN mission in the
Central African Republic, gave an interview shortly after the repatriation of the DRC contingent. Describing the MINUSCA troops, Onanga-Anyanga was unusually blunt. He said: “We
inherited troops that we cannot call troops. I realized that what was sent here was trash.”188
UN ofﬁcials are usually much more restrained in their public comments because they recognize that their actions and comments affect not only on the United Nations’ reputation,
but also the reputations of UN member states.189 It is embarrassing for troop-contributing
countries to be associated with poor discipline or misconduct generally—and all the more so
to be associated with sexual exploitation and abuse.190 The desire to avoid such reputational
harm can inhibit states from contributing personnel in the ﬁrst place.191 It can also cause
185
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states to withdraw troops that they have already contributed.192 Finally, it can affect which
UN policies states choose to support. At the 2016 Security Council meeting that led to a
resolution on sexual exploitation and abuse, the United States proposed text that endorsed
repatriation and replacement of all military and formed police units where the contributing
country failed to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and hold perpetrators
accountable.193 The Egyptian representative objected on the grounds that this provision
would “allow taking arbitrary and unobjective decisions” that would “tarnish the reputation
of troop-contributing countries.”194 In the end, an amendment he proposed failed to pass,
and the text proposed by the United States was adopted.195 The Egyptian representative
emphasized, though, that in the General Assembly, where troop-contributing countries
have more inﬂuence, that resolution “never would have been adopted.”196
This basic dynamic—an international organization overlooking instances where member
states have not complied with the organization’s own rules or demands in order to keep
resources ﬂowing—can be found outside the United Nations as well. Take the World
Bank, for example. Its loans to member states typically come with strings: there are various
conditions that member states agree to satisfy before the Bank will extend the loans. At least
historically, the Bank would often overlook violations of those and terms and conditions.197 A
key reason was the desire to retain a cooperative relationship with interest-paying borrowing
states to ensure that they keep borrowing—and thereby supply funds for the Bank’s ongoing
operations.198
In reputational terms, both of these examples highlight just how much care international
organizations will take to retain reputations for cooperativeness with and responsiveness to a
key audience: those states that provide essential resources to the organization.
C. Problematic Responses: Zero Tolerance as an Empty Gesture?
The dynamics between the United Nations and countries that supply troops for UN peace
operations suggest that, when it comes to efforts to address sexual violence by UN peacekeepers and others implementing UN mandates, the United Nations faces the kinds of
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contradictory institutional pressures that may make symbolic or cosmetic approaches especially tempting. This section reviews the development and evolution the United Nations’ zero
tolerance policy” regarding sexual exploitation and abuse in 2005, nearly a decade before the
allegations against the Sangaris surfaced.199 Koﬁ Annan promulgated this policy in response
to revelations of sexual exploitation and prostitution in UN refugee camps in Guinea, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone following the leak of a report prepared for the Ofﬁce of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2002.200 Michael Lipson has argued that the
United Nations’ response to these revelations was a manifestation of organized hypocrisy:
in his view, the adoption of the policy, coupled with a handful of statements expressing outrage, constituted a deliberate substitute for real changes.201 The CAR Panel Report is similarly dismissive of the zero-tolerance policy, declaring that it “has had little effect”202 If the
zero-tolerance policy was an empty gesture, perhaps the United Nations’ mishandling of sexual violence in the Central African Republic is the expected result.
This section questions that characterization. Lipson is surely right that the conﬂicting
demands and multiple audiences the United Nations faces may make a purely symbolic
response tempting. A closer look at the aftermath of that policy’s adoption suggests, however,
that classifying an organization’s response as either symbolic or sincere is not so easy. Steps
that might be written off as symbolic may in fact be positive incremental steps that are necessary but, by themselves, insufﬁcient to address the problem.
To see why, it is necessary ﬁrst to take a closer look at the problem that prompted the adoption of the zero-tolerance policy. After the report became public, UNHCR enlisted the United
Nations’ Ofﬁce of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to verify the information it contained.203 After an in-depth investigation,204 the team issued a ﬁnal report substantiating a
handful of allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation against a UN volunteer, a UN peacekeeper, and some NGO staff members who worked in the refugee camps. Notably, the investigative team concluded that “[t]he evidence did not substantiate any of the cases involving
regular United Nations staff members.”205
In light of these ﬁndings, the zero-tolerance policy may well appear poorly targeted to address
the problem. After all, the policy focuses on UN ofﬁcials, making clear that acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute serious misconduct and are “therefore grounds for serious
disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal.”206 The zero-tolerance policy does address
UN peacekeepers, stating that “United Nations forces conducting operations under United
199
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Nations command and control are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse . . . .”207 But this provision initially had limited efﬁcacy. In 2005, following media
reports that UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were sexually exploiting and abusing Congolese women and girls, then the secretary-general appointed Prince Zeid
Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (who would later become the High Commissioner for Human Rights)
to write a comprehensive report.208 Among other things, Al-Hussein’s report pointed out that
the zero-tolerance policy’s provision regarding peacekeepers was not legally binding: “Rules can
be made binding on military members of contingents only with the agreement of and action by
the troop-contributing country concerned.”209 The troop-contributing countries had not
agreed to make them binding—indeed, they had not even been asked to do so.
Even taking these features of the zero-tolerance policy into account, it is possible to cast the
zero-tolerance policy in a more positive light than Lipson does. The individuals who have
engaged (or may in the future engage) in sexual violence and exploitation while implementing
UN policies or mandates hold a range of positions within or relationships to the United
Nations. From the victim’s perspective, “it is immaterial whether the perpetrator was wearing
a blue helmet or not. In either case, there has been a betrayal of trust by the very person who
has been authorized by the UN to protect civilians.”210 But from the perspective of the
United Nations, these differences do matter because the organization’s legal authority and
practical control over individuals varies. As a legal and bureaucratic matter, the organization
cannot ignore the differences among these categories, which contribute to the complexity of
the task the United Nations faces in effectively confronting sexual violence by UN-afﬁliated
individuals.
Considering this context, then, the zero-tolerance policy might be characterized as an
important and necessary ﬁrst step—though one that does not supply a comprehensive solution. Adopting a policy that applies to UN ofﬁcials is a sensible place to start. After all, among
the individuals who may engage in sexual violence while implementing UN mandates, the
United Nations has the most authority and control over its own ofﬁcials. The General
Assembly and the UN secretary-general are in a position to set the terms, conditions, and
standards of their employment, and the secretary-general is authorized to enforce them by
imposing disciplinary measures on any staff members who engage in misconduct.211
Under these circumstances, it would have been strange for the United Nations not to clarify
the standards that apply to its own ofﬁcials when trying to address the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse more generally.
When it comes to UN peacekeepers, the critique of the zero-tolerance policy as cosmetic or
symbolic has greater force. But in the years that followed, the General Assembly and the UN
Secretariat took the necessary steps to legally apply the prohibition on sexual exploitation and
207
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abuse to UN peacekeepers. Within two years of Al-Hussein’s report, the General Assembly
had implemented his recommendation to revise the model memorandum of understanding
(MOU) between the United Nation and troop-contributing countries so that it would incorporate the zero-tolerance policy.212 By 2009, the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations reported that all existing MOUs had been amended to reﬂect the revised
model MOU.213
Notably, at that point, the zero-tolerance policy still did not apply to troops that were not
under UN command. It was only after the incidents in the Central African Republic became
widely known that UN bodies focused on applying the zero-tolerance policy to non-UNcommand troops. In 2016, the General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing uniform
standards and reafﬁrming that “all categories of personnel in United Nations peacekeeping
operation must be held to the same standard of conduct so as to preserve the image, credibility, impartiality and integrity of the United Nations . . . .”214 To apply the zero-tolerance
policy to non-UN-command troops, the Security Council must become involved. And in
the secretary-general’s 2017 report on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, he urged the
Security Council to do exactly that when drafting mandates for non-UN forces.215
To be sure, articulating a zero-tolerance policy and ensuring that it applies to all individuals
involved in peace operations is only one facet of a comprehensive approach to addressing sexual violence perpetrated by UN-afﬁliated individuals. Many other policies and procedures
(for example, those governing prevention, complaints, investigation, reporting, and victim
support) need to be developed—and they also need to be implemented. But focusing on
the basic step of articulating and applying the zero-tolerance policy highlights some of the
complexities that the United Nations faces when it comes to establishing and carrying out
a comprehensive set of policies to address sexual violence by UN-afﬁliated individuals.
There are clear temptations to opt for symbolic ﬁxes—but classifying the zero-tolerance policy as symbolic or genuine is difﬁcult.
D. Problematic Responses: Suppressing Information About Sexual Violence in the Central African
Republic?
As explained in Part II, the value of a good reputation to international organizations, combined with available tools for suppressing information, may make it tempting to suppress or
conceal damaging information. Over the years, NGOs, UN ofﬁcials, and academic commentators have decried the “culture of silence” that pervades the United Nations when it comes to
sexual violence and other kinds of abuse and exploitation perpetrated by UN-afﬁliated individuals.216 Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, having replaced Babacar Gaye as the head of the UN
212
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Mission in the Central African Republic, repeated over and over that the “days of silence are
over” when it comes to sexual exploitation and abuse217—suggesting that days of silence had
indeed preceded. Recall too that The Guardian news article that broke the story of the allegations against the Sangaris described Anders Kompass as a whistleblower who faced disciplinary proceedings for his singular willingness to take the allegations seriously.218 Subsequent
press coverage likewise referred to Kompass as a “whistleblower” who suffered retaliation after
“leaking” information about the allegations against the French forces.219
A closer look reveals no indications of the starkest methods that one might imagine to hide
derogatory information—shutting down investigations or shredding documents in order to
keep people outside of the United Nations from learning about the allegations. But it does
expose deliberate choices to leave some stones unturned and to exclude information from
public reports. Perhaps more surprisingly, there are some indications that the Secretariat
downplayed some exculpatory information about its handling of the allegations against the
Sangaris.
1. Investigations, public reports, and the whistleblower
A ﬁrst question is how UN ofﬁcials in Bangui reacted to the initial allegations against the
Sangaris. One possibility would be to simply ignore them. But, as described above, they did
not. Instead, Renner Onana immediately authorized an investigation220—though he
“warned [the interviewers] about the sensitivity of this investigation and the deﬂagration
that this investigation will create.”221 The CAR Panel Report pointed out that Onana
could have done more: some of the children who were interviewed described other child victims.222 No UN ofﬁcials tried to identify, speak with, or provide services to those other child
victims.223 There may be room to criticize Onana’s actions—but there is no indication in the
CAR Report, other UN documents, or subsequent press reports that the organization willfully blinded itself to avoid learning about the allegations.
Second, there is the issue of whether and how information about the allegations against the
Sangaris was made public. In 2014, as various individuals and ofﬁces within the Secretariat
learned about the allegations, two regular reports offered possible vehicles for making the public aware of the allegations. Neither clearly required information about these allegations. One
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was the annual report by the secretary-general on sexual exploitation and abuse.224 But these
reports—which the secretary-general had been producing since 2003—did not at that time
include information about allegations against forces like the Sangaris that were not under UN
command.225 The other report was the secretary-general’s annual report on children and
armed conﬂict. The secretary-general started generating these reports in 2005, following
the Security Council’s request that he establish a monitoring and reporting mechanism on
children and armed conﬂict.226 The reports address six grave violations of humanitarian
law, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, when committed by any party to
an armed conﬂict, including “state armed forces, paramilitaries, [and] non-state armed
groups.”227 According to the CAR Panel Report, after internal debates about whether
Sangaris forces were appropriately characterized as a party to an armed conﬂict, the decision
was made to exclude information about the allegations against the Sangaris.228 Whether to
characterize peacekeepers and others tasked with implementing peace operations as parties to
an armed conﬂict is a genuinely difﬁcult and controversial question.229 The view that the
allegations against the Sangaris do not ﬁt the monitoring and report mechanism criteria is
plausible as a legal matter. For that reason, the initial decision to exclude the Sangaris allegations does not, by itself, indicate a desire to suppress damaging information.
The publication of The Guardian story on April 29, 2015230 marks an inﬂection point
when it comes to the United Nations’ actions and incentives to publicly release information
about sexual violence allegations against various individuals implementing UN mandates.
Until that point, downplaying information about such allegations might have appeared conducive to protecting the organization’s reputation. But once the story broke, the risks associated with further efforts to hide information became signiﬁcantly greater.231 Indeed, after
the newspaper story was published, the United Nations became signiﬁcantly more forthcoming about allegations of sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse in the Central African
224

These reports are produced pursuant to GA Res. 57/306 (May 22, 2003).
In June 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that requested the secretary-general to “to
include in future reports [on sexual exploitation and abuse] information on allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse by non-United Nations forces operating under a Security Council Mandate.” GA Res. 70/286, para. 82
(July 8, 2016). The 2017 report on SEA included those allegations for the ﬁrst time. See 2017 SEA Report,
supra note 215.
226
SC Res. 1612, paras. 2–3 (July 26, 2005).
227
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT,
MONITORING AND REPORTING MECHANISM (MRM) ON GRAVE VIOLATIONS AGAINST CHILDREN IN SITUATIONS OF
ARMED CONFLICT, FIELD MANUAL, at 15–16 (2014), available at http://www.mrmtools.org/mrm/ﬁles/
MRM_Field_5_June_2014.pdf.
228
CAR Panel Report, supra note 33, at 38.
229
The question is both controversial and important because the answer, among other things, determines
whether peacekeepers can be lawful targets. See, e.g., D.W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY
484–516 (1964); Dietrich Schindler, United Nations Forces and International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES
AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 521 (Christopher Swinarski ed.,
1984); Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 185
(1996); Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61 (1997); Devon Whittle, Peacekeeping in Conﬂict: The
Intervention Brigade, MONUSCO, and the Application for International Humanitarian Law to United Nations
Forces, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837 (2015).
230
Laville, supra note 1.
231
Daugirdas 2019, supra note 14 (identifying a similar inﬂection point in connection with the United
Nations’ response to the cholera outbreak in Haiti).
225

2019

REPUTATION AS A DISCIPLINARIAN OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

257

Republic and also more generally. Most signiﬁcantly, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commissioned the CAR Panel Report. In June 2015, the United Nations reversed course on what
information belonged in the monitoring and report mechanism reports and started including
allegations against both peacekeepers and non-UN command forces.232
Likewise, in the months that followed the publication of The Guardian story, the United
Nations started to share more information about new allegations with the media.233 The
Secretariat has since taken further steps to make at least some types of information publicly
available more quickly. Most signiﬁcantly, the Secretariat now makes available online “near
real-time information on allegations received as well as updates to previously reported allegations, going back to 2015.”234 This website includes allegations against UN ofﬁcials and UN
peacekeepers, both military and police, though allegations against non-UN command forces
are excluded.235 At least with respect to allegations of sexual violence against these categories
of actors, the United Nations has established policies to mandate disclosure.
Third, there is the apparent whistleblower—Anders Kompass, who was at the time the
director of a division within the UN Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Although Kompass’s disclosures pre-dated The Guardian article, his story does not neatly ﬁt
the narrative of an international organization seeking to punish an ofﬁcial who exposed to the
public evidence that his organization has engaged in wrongdoing.
According to the CAR Panel Report, on July 23, 2014, exactly one month after Palayret’s
interviews were completed, Kompass told the deputy representative of the French mission in
Geneva about the allegations.236 The French representative asked for a copy of the interview
notes, and Kompass provided them a few days later without making any modiﬁcations or
redactions.237 These communications constitute the “leaking” for which Kompass was
later suspended and investigated. According to subsequent press reports, “sources close to
the case” said that Kompass passed the document to the French authorities “because of the
UN’s failure to take action to stop the abuse.”238
To start, it is odd to characterize Kompass’s sharing of the allegations with the French government as “leaking” because he did not make the information available to the public.
According to the CAR Panel Report, some OHCHR staff believed that, by sharing the
232
UN Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conﬂict, para. 44, UN Doc. A/69/926-S/2015/409 (June 5,
2015); UN Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conﬂict, para. 43, UN Doc. A/70/836-S/2016/360 (Apr. 20,
2016).
233
See supra notes 144, 149–150 (newspaper stories that rely in part on information provided by ofﬁcial UN
sources).
234
United Nations, Conduct in UN Field Missions: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Table of Allegations, at
https://conduct.unmissions.org/table-of-allegations; see also 2017 SEA Report, supra note 215, para. 70 (“[T]he
global public has long become accustomed to learning of serious social transgressions through news outlets in addition to ofﬁcial sources. The United Nations must responsibly and regularly make use of respected news outlets in
the service of greater transparency and accountability. My Spokesperson will establish a system to ensure that
appropriate facts regarding credible reports of sexual exploitation and abuse are publicly and regularly released
to the media, as standard practice.”).
235
United Nations, Conduct in UN Field Missions: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Alleged Perpetrators, at
https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-subjects.
236
CAR Panel Report, supra note 33, at 65.
237
Id.
238
Laville, supra note 1.

258

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Vol. 113:2

allegations in this way, Kompass was simply doing his job.239 That is also how the French
government understood Kompass’s communication: the French responded with a formal
diplomatic note thanking him for bringing the allegations to the government’s attention.240
In other words, this reaction suggests that the French government did not view Kompass as
making a secret, unauthorized disclosure of adverse information about the United Nations.
In any case involving claims of whistleblower retaliation, there are competing accounts of
the motivation for penalizing the employee making a disclosure. According to Kompass’s boss
—Al-Hussein, the High Commissioner for Human Rights—the problem was not Kompass’s
desire for a robust response to the allegations against the Sangaris soldiers.241 Instead, AlHussein told the CAR Panel, two aspects of Kompass’s disclosure troubled him. First, he
(and some other staff in OHCHR) believed that Kompass had, on more than one occasion,
shared sensitive information with a member state in order to curry favor and support for a promotion.242 The second issue was that Kompass had ﬂouted norms regarding conﬁdentiality
when he shared with the French government an unredacted copy of the notes that included
names and other identifying information about the child victims and witnesses.243
Even if the response to Kompass’s disclosure is not a classic case of retaliation against a
whistleblower, it still serves as a cautionary tale about the consequences to UN ofﬁcials of
taking forceful action on the basis of ambiguous authority—even in a situation where the
action in question had a “signiﬁcant and positive effect,”244 that is, it prompted French
authorities to launch a criminal investigation. The United Nations’ internal investigation
eventually cleared Kompass of all charges.245 Nevertheless, his widely publicized experience
may reinforce preexisting incentives that exist for UN ofﬁcials to avoid taking risks.246
2. A twist: Downplaying exculpatory information?
This ﬁnal subsection returns to the French government’s handling of the allegations during
the period after Kompass shared Palayret’s interview notes and before The Guardian’s exposé
was published—that is, between July 2014 and April 2015. As noted above, when Palayret
initially shared information about the allegations with the French military in Bangui, she
239
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described their reaction in positive terms.247 Likewise, after diplomats in Geneva and
New York learned of the allegations, the French government dispatched investigators to
Bangui immediately and the public prosecutor’s ofﬁce in Paris opened a preliminary
inquiry.248 After The Guardian story became public, then-President Hollande likewise
took a strong stand against impunity.249
In between, though, relatively little happened. The French investigators dispatched to
Bangui in August 2014 did not interview any of the children making allegations during
that initial trip.250 Nor did the prosecutor’s ofﬁce take any apparent steps to interview possible perpetrators until after The Guardian story broke.251 The public prosecutor in Paris
launched a formal investigation into the allegations on May 7, 2015, shortly after The
Guardian story was published.252 The prosecutor’s ofﬁce suggested that the United
Nations was to blame for its inactivity up to that point, explaining that the prosecutor wanted
ﬁrst to interview Palayret, but “the international institution refused to lift its immunity, preferring instead to respond to a written questionnaire.”253
The French prosecutor’s suggestion that that the United Nations inappropriately impeded
its own investigation does not withstand scrutiny, however. The United Nations does have
comprehensive immunities, but those immunities did not pose an obstacle to Palayret’s cooperation with the investigation. In a press conference the next day, the spokesperson for the
UN secretary-general explained that the request to lift immunity was a red herring:
[T]here was no need to lift immunity because this cooperation would be done on a voluntary basis without any prejudice to the investigation . . . to our immunities. . . . [T]he
issue of immunity, I think, is one that is not always fully grasped by those that don’t cover
the UN on a regular basis. The UN lifts the immunities of its staff members in a number
of cases when they need to testify in front of judges, in front of courts. We do that. The
immunity is not there to stand in the way of justice being served. At this point, if there’s
no need to lift the immunity, it’s not lifted. If there is a need to lift the immunity to provide testimony before a judge or a court in a legal proceeding, it is studied. It is very often
done.254
Even more importantly, however, it is not at all clear why the prosecutor’s ofﬁce insisted on
interviewing Palayret before proceeding with the investigation. After all, the ofﬁce already had
in its possession Palayret’s unredacted interview notes, which included details about both the
children she interviewed and about the alleged perpetrators—including information about
247
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their names, nicknames, tattoos, piercings, and distinctive jewelry.255 The notes supplied
many leads that the French investigators apparently declined to pursue until after The
Guardian story broke.
To put it bluntly, the French scapegoated the United Nations for its own inaction. What is
striking is that, apart from the single press conference quoted above, the United Nations did
very little to protect its reputation by contradicting this narrative. Through its silence and
passivity, the Secretariat seems even to have facilitated the shifting of blame from the
French government to the United Nations.256 Consider the CAR Panel Report’s treatment
of the issue. Echoing the public prosecutor’s ofﬁce, the report criticized the UN legal ofﬁce for
asserting immunity and declared that the ofﬁce’s “failure to give appropriate weight to the
goal of accountability unnecessarily impeded the French investigation and may have resulted
in the loss of relevant evidence.”257 The report further underscored the issue in its recommendations, encouraging the United Nations to “[a]dopt an approach to immunity that presumes
cooperation and active participation of UN staff in accountability processes.”258 In his formal
response to the CAR Report, the secretary-general did nothing to contest the characterization
of immunity as an obstacle to the French investigation; instead, he wrote that he has “accepted
and implemented the Panel’s recommendation that the Organization adopt an approach to
immunity that presumes the cooperation and active participation of United Nations staff in
accountability processes.”259
Here again, a reputational lens can explain what might initially seem puzzling: the United
Nations downplayed information that might have mitigated some of the signiﬁcant reputational damage that the organization incurred. The key is to break out the organization’s multiple audiences. By highlighting the French investigators’ failure to do more
with the information they had at their disposal early on, the United Nations might
have avoided some damage to its own reputation among the public. But doing so
would simultaneously impair the organization’s relationship with a powerful P-5 member. Whether by virtue of a calculated decision or not, the United Nations took the
bullet.
The United Nations, like other international organizations, makes choices about what
information to make available and what information to keep under wraps. In general,
international organizations possess some important tools that allow them to suppress
adverse information. And, in some instances, individual UN ofﬁcials have some incentives
to suppress adverse information. However, as the speciﬁc incidents reviewed in this section
illustrate, the desire to protect the organization’s reputation in the eyes of the public is only
part of the story.

255

France 2 Envoyé spécial, supra note 169.
This is another example of the way that silence helps to shape reputations. See supra note 49.
257
CAR Panel Report, supra note 33, at 56.
258
Id. at 95.
259
Report of the Secretary General, Combating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, para. 74, UN Doc. A/71/97
(June 23, 2016).
256

2019

REPUTATION AS A DISCIPLINARIAN OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

261

E. The Missing Dimension of Reputation: The United Nations’ Reputation for Compliance with
Legal Obligations
Over and over again, UN secretaries-general have condemned sexual violence by UN
peacekeepers and others tasked with implementing UN mandates, describing it as an urgent
problem the organization must solve.260 Notably, however, inside the United Nations—and
to a large degree outside the United Nations as well—this discussion has not been framed in
legal terms. On the one hand, this framing is not surprising: the United Nations’ acts and
omissions regarding sexual violence do not constitute a clear violation of international law
for which the organization is responsible. On the other hand, the absence of a strong claim
that the United Nations has violated international law—and the fact that its reputation for compliance with international law is not threatened—may help explain why reputational damage
has not prompted a more dramatic response within the organization and from member states.
International organizations (like states) are responsible for violations of international law if
two criteria are met: the organization’s conduct—that is, its acts or omissions—(1) must be
attributable to the organization, and (2) must constitute a violation of international law.261
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations (Draft Articles) specify the conduct that is attributable to international organizations. Such conduct includes the conduct of organs or agents of the organization; the conduct of organs and agents of a state that are placed at the disposal of an international
organization, if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct; and conduct
that is not otherwise attributable but is accepted or adopted by the organization as its own.262
Applying this framework to the sexual abuses by the French Sangaris is straightforward.
There is little doubt that the allegations against the Sangaris describe serious violations of
international law. But as a matter of international responsibility, their conduct is attributable
to France, not to the United Nations.263 As noted above, although they were in the Central
African Republic pursuant to a UN mandate, the French troops were not under UN command.264 The commentary to the Draft Articles explains that the articles do not expressly
assert—although they do imply—“that conduct of military forces of States . . . is not attributable to the United Nations when the Security Council authorizes States . . . to take necessary measures outside a chain of command linking those forces to the United Nations.”265
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The analysis for UN peacekeepers participating in MINUSCA is a little less straightforward,
but the result is the same: acts of sexual violence committed by the peacekeepers are not attributable to the United Nations. The key provision of the Draft Articles provides:
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization
that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered
under international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.266
In other words, attribution turns on the “factual control that is exercised over the speciﬁc
conduct taken by the organ or agent placed at the receiving organization’s disposal.”267
As Tom Dannenbaum has persuasively argued, under the legal regime that currently governs the relationship between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries, it is the
troop-contributing country that exercises “effective control” when UN peacekeepers perpetrate sexual violence.268 To support this conclusion, Dannenbaum carefully considers both
the formal legal relationship between the UN and the practical dynamics between them.
Under the legal arrangements that govern peacekeeping, the United Nations is limited to exercising “operational control,” which falls considerably short of “full command” and allocates
decision making over key issues, including discipline and training, to national ofﬁcials.269
As a practical matter, the United Nations’ control is limited even further: overt disobedience
of UN commanders is not unheard of, and troop-contributing states exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the formulation and execution of peacekeeping missions.270 Troop contributions are
voluntary, and the “threat of withdrawal can be used as an ultimatum to resolve disputes over
the direction of a mission or the speciﬁc situation of the national contingent.”271
These conclusions do not end the inquiry about the legality of the United Nations’ conduct, however. The United Nations could also incur international responsibility if it has violated international law by failing to do enough to prevent sexual violence to aid victims or to
hold individual perpetrators accountable. As noted above, although UN secretaries-general
have, on multiple occasions, insisted that the organization must do better along these dimensions, they have never suggested that the United Nations has a legal obligation to do so. The
CAR Panel’s report suggests that this view carries over to lower-level ofﬁcials. Indeed, when it
came to the allegations against the Sangaris, some UN ofﬁcials went further. Not only did
they lack a legal obligation to address the allegations against the Sangaris—but, they said,
they believed they lacked the legal authority to do so.272
266
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Some external actors have argued that the United Nations does indeed have legal obligations when it comes to preventing and responding to allegations of sexual violence by UN
peacekeepers or other soldiers under UN command. The CAR Panel Report suggested as
much.273 Separately, at least one NGO has argued that the United Nations has a due diligence obligation “to ensure that civilians in the host State are protected from criminal acts
perpetrated by troop-contributing countries”—and incurs international responsibility
when that obligation is breached.274
These arguments are not implausible, but they are not a slam-dunk either. There are two
possible sources of such obligations. One is the UN Charter, which provides that the United
Nations “shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”275 The
difﬁculty here is translating this general language into speciﬁc rules governing the organization’s efforts to prevent and respond to acts of sexual violence. The other possible source of
these obligations is customary international law. But here there is even more room for contestation—about whether customary international law binds international organizations at
all, which human rights norms have customary law status, and how norms developed primarily to address the relationship between governments and individuals apply to international organizations.276
In sum, the United Nations’ legal obligations have played a muted role to date in
the organization’s handling of sexual violence by the Sangaris and UN peacekeepers in
the Central African Republic and elsewhere. This state of affairs is not set in stone, however. It is possible for international law—and by extension the United Nations’ reputation for complying with it—to feature more prominently. A variety of mechanisms are
available through which the United Nations could clarify its international obligations,
including treaties and unilateral statements.277 The next Part considers these, as well
as other possible mechanisms, to make reputation a more effective disciplinarian of international organizations.
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IV. CAN REPUTATION BE A GOOD—OR A BETTER—DISCIPLINARIAN?
A. Two General Lessons
1. Convergence About What Constitutes a Good Reputation
As this Article has shown, a key limitation of reputation as a disciplinarian is that reputations have multiple dimensions and organizations have multiple audiences. These multiplicities seriously complicate the pursuit of a “good” reputation. The implication is that
reputation will be most effective as a disciplinarian when there is agreement within an international organization and among its various audiences about what constitutes a good reputation. Put another way, one key take-away from this analysis is that reputation will be most
effective when the desire to maintain a good reputation does not tug organizations in conﬂicting directions.
For example, various reputational multiplicities converge (at least to some degree) when
it comes to sound ﬁnancial management—and more speciﬁcally avoiding corruption and
abuse of organizational resources for private beneﬁt. This issue received considerable attention in the early 2000s in connection with the United Nations’ oil-for-food program. That
program was designed to mitigate the effects on the civilian population of the comprehensive economic sanctions that the Security Council had imposed on Iraq by allowing the
Iraqi government to sell some oil to purchase basic necessities. After allegations of abuses
and mismanagement mounted in the press, former Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan
appointed former Federal Research Bank Chair Paul Volcker to head an independent
inquiry committee. That committee issued an interim report that cited “major failures
to abide by UN procurement and contracting procedures in the oil-for-food program,
and harshly criticized the program’s former director.”278 Annan understood the threat
the scandal posed to the organization and its reputation, saying: “For an organization
like the UN, any hint of corruption and misbehaviour and that sort of disrespect
for rules is harmful, and is dangerous and we cannot dismiss it, and we do take it seriously.”279 Volcker’s later report found “no personal misconduct by the secretary-general”
but nevertheless “faulted him for failing to prevent poor management and corruption in
the program.”280 Annan resisted calls from some quarters for his resignation and completed his second term as secretary-general—but the incident continues to be prominently
associated with his tenure.281
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In recent years, international organizations have adopted more robust rules and regulations
concerning the proper control of funds and have developed independent audit mechanisms to
enforce them.282 A recent incident shows that—in at least some cases—international organizations have strong incentives to follow through when serious violations are identiﬁed.
Recently, a UN audit found that Erik Solheim, who had been the executive director of the
UN Environment Program (UNEP), had repeatedly violated internal rules regarding travel
and had incurred half a million dollars in travel expenses in less than two years.283 According
to the press, the audit cited the “reputation risk” these violations posed to UNEP, especially in
light of its work ﬁghting climate change.284 Several European member states publicly threatened to halt funding for UNEP until the issues regarding Solheim were resolved.285 Finally,
Solheim, a Norwegian national, lost the support of his own government.286 Under these circumstances, asking for Solheim’s resignation was an easy call for Secretary-General
Guterres.287 The action required to bolster the organization’s reputation for morality and
legality aligned with the action demanded by key member states.
All that said, examples of genuine convergence about what constitutes a good reputation—
and what steps are necessary to maintain it—are likely to be rather rare. Even when it comes to
preventing and punishing corruption and ﬁnancial mismanagement, disagreements are likely
to emerge—and when they do, reputation’s efﬁcacy as a disciplinarian will diminish. Thus,
even if an international organization’s audiences agree that certain egregious forms of corruption or self-dealing are inappropriate and unacceptable, that agreement may dissipate when it
comes to other examples. As Michael Johnston has put it, corruption is a “deeply normative
concern”: while corruption can be usefully deﬁned as “the abuse of public roles or resources
for private beneﬁt,” every one of those key terms—“abuse,” “public,” “private,” and “beneﬁt”—is subject to some degree of ambiguity and contestation in many societies.288 The UN
secretary-general and his counterparts in other organizations may have a difﬁcult time ﬁring
ofﬁcials who retain signiﬁcant support among some member states—or when the seriousness
of their wrongdoing is disputed. (Indeed, even when it came to oil-for-food, the reaction
within member states varied quite signiﬁcantly based on ideology and partisanship.289)
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2. A Cautionary Note
A second lesson that emerges from this Article is that simply turning up the volume—seeking to make organizational reputation a more pressing concern—is not necessarily going to be
helpful because efforts to preserve a good reputation are not always going to be salutary.
Because reputations depend on others’ perceptions, an instruction to pay more attention
to reputation will not always have beneﬁcial results. In particular, it can prompt efforts to
tend to appearances instead of addressing the underlying reality, and thus create incentives
to adopt only symbolic or cosmetic measures, or to suppress damaging information.
There is yet another reason why a greater focus on reputation might be problematic: it may
make international organizations more risk averse. (Such risk aversion with respect to reputation is hardly unique to international organizations.290) Focusing more on reputation may
mean focusing more on the possibility of failure—and it is not clear that doing so across-theboard would enhance decision making by international organizations, which are often tasked
with trying to manage especially risky and dangerous situations.
To take just one example, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore scrutinized the work of
the UN Secretariat in the months leading up to what is still considered one of the organization’s biggest failures—its lack of forceful action to prevent genocide in Rwanda. Between
April 6 and July 19, 1994, roughly 800,000 Rwandans were killed.291 At the time, there
was a small peacekeeping force of about 2,500 troops, known as UNAMIR, to help implement
a previously negotiated ceaseﬁre in the country.292 Instead of ramping up its efforts, the
Security Council wound them down, voting on April 21—as the genocide was underway
—to reduce UNAMIR to 250 troops and to restrict its mandate to supporting the negotiation
of a new ceaseﬁre.293 Barnett and Finnemore focus their attention not on the members of the
Security Council, but rather on the UN Secretariat, observing that, “[d]uring these ﬁrst critical weeks the Secretariat did little to discourage the emerging consensus in the Security
Council in favor of withdrawal. It failed to recommend an intervention to protect civilians
or even to lay one on the table for serious consideration.”294
Barnett and Finnemore do not frame their analysis in terms of reputation. They focus
instead on bureaucratic pathologies, and in particular the Secretariat’s undue privileging of
rules and procedures at the expense of the United Nations’ overarching purposes. But
their narrative account of decision making within the Secretariat can also be framed in reputational terms as an illustration about how concern about reputation can make organizations
290
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excessively risk averse. In particular, Barnett and Finnemore describe an organization still reeling from a disaster in Somalia and desperate to avoid another failure.295 As they explain, this
fear colored the way the organization interpreted the information it was receiving from ofﬁcials on the ground in Rwanda and the scope of the peacekeeping missions’ mandate.296
In short, more concern about reputation is not always better. As a result, it may not be a
good idea to instruct international civil servants to strive (more) to protect the reputation of
the organization that employs them.297 Another implication, addressed in more detail below,
is that more transparency is not necessarily better. Disclosures of information can raise the
reputational stakes for organizations, but not always in productive ways. A more nuanced
analysis is needed—one that takes reputational dynamics into account. The next section considers what insights a reputational lens can offer for shaping UN policies related to sexual
violence.
B. (Re-)Orienting Reputational Concerns
As Part III’s case study of the Central African Republic demonstrates, when it comes to the
issue of preventing and responding to sexual violence, reputational concerns pulled the
United Nations in different directions. Among other things, the Secretariat had to contend
with member states who were quite concerned about how the organization’s acts or omissions
would reﬂect on their own reputations.298 This dynamic raises the question: is there a way to
reorient reputational concerns to mitigate this tension between the organization and its member states? One promising reorientation is to focus on the way that states respond to allegations. Indeed, there already seems to be some support for this framing among UN member
states and within the secretariat. As Isobel Coleman, former U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations for Management and Reform put it, allegations should not be the source of dishonor
for troop-contributing countries. Instead, “[t]he dishonor is not prosecuting credible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse to restore integrity to peacekeeping.”299
To see why such a reorientation would be helpful, consider the secretary-general’s annual
reports on sexual exploitation and abuse. The General Assembly has required the publication
of these reports since 2003.300 In general, information disclosure can heighten the salience of
reputation in general—as well as the salience of particular dimensions of reputation. Thus, for
example, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act requires companies to disclose
their efforts (or lack thereof) to ensure that their supply chains are free from slavery and
human trafﬁcking.301 At least in theory, this law will encourage ﬁrms to take steps to supervise
their supply chains, in part by making it easier for activists and NGOs to “exert reputational
pressure as part of a campaign for better sourcing and human rights practices among
295
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companies.”302 The secretary-general’s annual reports on sexual exploitation and abuse constitute the most salient information disclosures that the organization is currently making. The
reports also help sustain attention by prompting discussion among UN member states303 and
by generating press stories304 at regular intervals.
It is worth carefully considering the content of these reports. Among other things, they tally
the nature and number of allegations made against UN ofﬁcials and peacekeepers every year.
This does not necessarily communicate useful information to the United Nations’ audiences
about how they ought to evaluate the organization’s efforts because the number of allegations
does not bear any consistent or reliable relationship to the actual size of the problem.
Underreporting is a signiﬁcant problem. Moreover, the degree of underreporting may be
inversely related to the quality of the United Nations’ response to allegations of sexual violence and exploitation. That is, victims are less likely to bother making a report if they believe
that doing so is pointless or if they fear being blamed or otherwise penalized by reporting such
allegations.305 A higher number of incidents may reﬂect a bigger problem on the ground, but
it may also reﬂect a better response on the part of the organization. In its annual reports, the
United Nations has chosen the positive interpretation both when allegations have decreased
(crediting the effectiveness of its preventing efforts) and when they have increased (crediting
victims’ increased willingness to come forward).306
Separately, relying on the total number of allegations as a measure of success or failure of
the organization’s efforts to combat sexual violence may create a temptation to reduce the
recorded number of allegations in pathological ways. Measuring success in this way might
cause the organization or individual ofﬁcials to discourage victims from making reports, or
to decline to follow up on information that may lead to allegations. This temptation may be
all the greater because reporting allegations and the nationalities of the alleged perpetrators
puts the organization in a confrontational posture with troop-contributing countries, who
fear that publicizing that information will dishonor their troops and damage their national
reputations.307
Secretary-General Guterres has already taken some promising steps to support such a reorientation. In his very ﬁrst report to the General Assembly, Guterres included a new annex—
one that highlighted the best practices that member states have adopted to prevent and
respond to sexual exploitation and abuse. The annex elaborated on those practices and
302
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identiﬁed by name the states that designed and implemented them.308 Building on this effort
to allow states to burnish their reputations by strengthening their responses to sexual exploitation and abuse, Guterres also invited current and former heads of state (or government) to
join a “Circle of Leadership on the prevention of and response to sexual exploitation and
abuse in United Nations operations.”309 One of the participants’ ﬁrst acts was to issue a collective statement afﬁrming their personal commitment as global leaders to support efforts to
combat sexual exploitation and abuse across the United Nations system.310 Currently seventy-two sitting and former heads of state are members of this Circle.311
Guterres has also developed a new kind of “voluntary compact” that troop-contributing
countries may enter into with the United Nations. These compacts have three overarching
objectives:
(a) to clearly deﬁne the speciﬁc commitments of both the Organization and the Member
States in advancing our joint efforts to combat sexual exploitation and abuse;
(b) to accelerate the timely implementation of agreed measures; and
(c) to strengthen coordination and coherence in our collective response in cases involving
civilian and uniformed personnel alike.312
So far, one hundred states have signed the voluntary compact with the secretary-general.313
Like the efforts described above, these voluntary compacts offer a means to reorient attention
(and, by extension, reputation) to focus on responses to rather than the existence of
allegations.
Shifting attention to responses rather than allegations may also helpfully alter the dynamics
surrounding sexual violence by framing the issue as a common problem that the organization
and troop-contributing countries are working together to solve. As the Central African
Republic case study illustrates, UN ofﬁcials struggle when they must confront member states
that are suppliers of key organizational resources. This dynamic makes it important to consider how such confrontations might be defused. There are a number of areas where the
Secretariat might provide useful technical assistance to troop-contributing countries—for
example by promulgating model policies regarding sexual violence or by reviewing national
legislation to ensure that acts prohibited by the UN zero-tolerance policy are also penalized
pursuant to domestic law.
While the Secretariat has taken some positive steps, they are not sufﬁcient on their own.
For starters, it is important to sustain these efforts over time. Guterres’s 2018 report omitted
all annexes, directing readers to a website for detailed information about allegations, and
reporting simply that he encourages member states to continue to “share their experiences
308
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and best practices.”314 Omitting the best-practices annex is a mistake. The Circle of
Leadership complements—but does not substitute for—praising speciﬁc practices implemented by speciﬁc states, especially because participation in the Circle does not require taking
any particular concrete steps.
In addition, a reputational lens highlights a key challenge for the voluntary compacts:
ensuring that they are not merely a symbolic or cosmetic response but instead actually inﬂuence conduct on the ground. What, if anything, happens if participating states or the United
Nations fail to implement these commitments? The discussion in Parts I and II suggests that it
will be quite difﬁcult for the UN Secretariat to confront troop-contributing countries about
such failures. In light of the predictable pressure that the UN ofﬁcials will face to overlook
noncompliance with the voluntary compact, the establishment of an independent monitoring
mechanism is worth exploring. States may bristle at the prospect, but the Secretariat may have
some tools at its disposal to entice participation. Perhaps continued participation in the Circle
of Leadership could depend on accepting such a monitoring mechanism.
Another possibility would be to convert the voluntary compact into a legally binding agreement—and thereby raise the reputational stakes by putting on the line the reputations of both
participating states and the United Nations or complying with international law. Of course,
even if the United Nations were willing to take that step, troop-contributing countries may
not be. If that is the case, the United Nations could announce a unilateral legal commitment
regarding its handling of legal obligations. Such a commitment could be freestanding or
framed as elaborations of the organization’s preexisting obligations under the UN Charter
or customary international law. Coupling this step with an independent monitoring mechanism would be even more signiﬁcant.315
Finally, it would also be helpful to resolve conﬂicts within the organization with respect to
what constitutes an effective response to allegations of sexual violence. Recall the discussion of
the UN Bangui ofﬁce’s interactions with the French investigators in August 2015—and the
apparent tension between the human rights ofﬁcials’ focus on protecting victims and goal of
facilitating the French criminal investigation.316 The question of how to advance prosecutions while also protecting child victims and witnesses and respecting their rights to privacy
and conﬁdentiality raises some genuinely difﬁcult issues. Advocates, scholars, and international organization ofﬁcials have wrestled with these issues in other contexts, including
with respect to prosecutions in the International Criminal Court.317 In response to a recommendation from the CAR Panel report,318 the Secretariat reports progress in developing a
“uniform policy on balancing the disclosure of information to national authorities with
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principles of conﬁdentiality” when handling allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.319
The secretary-general intends to formalize and publish this policy as a bulletin before the end
of 2018.320 The bulletin will merit close scrutiny to ascertain the likelihood that it has successfully resolved the tension between protection and prosecution—and has helped to align
views within OHCHR and the UN Secretariat about what constitutes a reputation for
effectiveness.
The more general point is that a reputational lens can usefully inform policy discussions.
Some of the observations above are widely applicable—for example, that more transparency
will not always improve reputational dynamics or lead to better outcomes. Separately, a reputational lens can help to identify policies that will be difﬁcult to implement robustly because
doing so requires individuals or organizations to provoke confrontations with key audience
members, or to trade off one valued dimension of reputation against another. Policy design
should be sensitive to what is easy and hard for individuals or organizations to do—and
should seek to make desirable outcomes easier to achieve.
V. CONCLUSION
Hobbes observed that: “Reputation of power is power.”321 Sometimes reality and appearances converge; sometimes efforts to cultivate a particular kind of reputation drive a wedge
between reality and appearances. Both have causal force. In giving an account of when and
how international organizations’ secretariats are motivated to protect reputation, this Article
emphasizes that reputation is not always a salutary force. This feature of reputation makes it
all the more important to understand how reputational dynamics work. This Article has set
out to do that, recognizing that international organizations operate in an ecosystem made up
of other entities—most notably states—that are eager to protect their own reputations.
Scholarship has long recognized that international organizations can inﬂuence the reputation of states, especially by collecting, distilling, and communicating information about their
implementation of various international agreements.322 This Article has shifted the focus to
international organizations—or, to be more precise, their secretariats—as key actors that have
their own reputations. Like any other entity or individual, international organizations operate
under constraints. Their member states can make it easier or harder for secretariats to cultivate
any given facet of the organization’s reputation. A key question for future scholarship is
understanding when and why they do so.
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